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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines pension fund investments which are targetted
to benefit fund members or the general public. The paper first
discusses the obstacles to strategic investing, second, asks
why certain pension funds, especially the building trades union
pension funds, have been able to implement non-traditional invest-
ment policies, and third, identifies the essential elements in a
successful strategic investment policy.
The first chapter presents the problems with traditional pension
fund investment policies. Institutional barriers which prevent
changing traditional investment practices are described. Chapter
Two explores alternatives to traditional investing and offers
examples of strategic pension fund investments. The third chapter
discusses pension funds within the AFL-CIO Building and Construction
Trades Union, which have been the most successful at strategic
investing. After looking at these successful cases, two elements
are identified as supportive of strategic investing: 1) worker
representation in investment decisions and 2) access to responsive
financial institutions. Having identified these two elements, the
final chapter describes ways workers can attain more control in
investment decsions and use or develop institutions which are
responsive to strategic investment goals.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Pension funds of American workers are the largest single source of new
investment capital in the United States today. In 1980, pension funds provided
over twenty five percent (25%) of all new capital available for investment in
the United States economy. By the end of this decade, it is estimated that
pension funds will finance half of all new investments in the United States. By
1995, total pension fund assets are expected to be four trillion dollars! It is no
wonder that Senator Howard Metzenbaum noted that "without question those
who manage pension funds are in a position to play a crucial role in determining
the method and direction of the nation's economic growth and deilopment." 1
The current eight hundred billion dollars in pension funds is managed by a
few bankers and investors in the largest bank trust departments and insurance
companies in the country. The billions of dollars in pension funds are the
"deferred wages" of workers, but workers have very little say over how and
where their money is invested. In the United States, we have democratic
processes to decide how public revenues should be invested. But, with pension
funds, which are also social capital, owned by workers, democratic proceses
hardly exist. The-e are no public hearings or debates on how pension fund
money should be invested in the economy. By investing pension fund money, a
few bankers, literally, have the power to shape economic growth in this
country.
Unions, state and local governments and corporations are starting to
acknowledge the economic power of retirement funds and have begun to focus
attention on the investment of pension fund assets. A variety of government
and private organizations have set up task forces to review pension fund
investment policies. This attention on pension fund investments has been
triggered by the poor financial performance of pension funds, while in the hands
of bankers, over the last fifteen years. Past poor financial performance of
pension funds, inflation, calls for divestments from certain companies and the
concentrated control of the funds have all contributed to the questioning of
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traditional investment practices.
This discontent with traditional investment policies, has led to the
development of an alternative theory about how pension funds should be
invested, called "strategic investing". This term, "strategic investing",
generally means that investments are targetted in ways that "directly benefit
fund beneficiaries and the general public while still maintaining competitive
rates of return and keeping risks at acceptable levels." 2 Social returns which
accrue directly to the beneficiaries as well as the financial rate of return and
risks are considered in a "strategic investment" policy. Currently, there is
discussion among unions, state and local governments about strategic investing,
however, thus far, there has been little change investment practices. It is
evident there are obstacles to changing traditional pension fund investment
policies.
But a few pension funds have successfully implemented strategic
investments. This thesis asks the question, why is strategic investment easier
to implement for some pension funds than for others? In other words, what
characteristics about certain pension funds encourage them to pursue a
strategic investment policy?
In order to find an answer to this question, we must understand what
strategic investing is, what the obstacles are to its implementation, and then
examine cases of successful strategic pension fund investment. From the
existing cases, we can identify the common elements which support strategic
investing.
The first chapter of this thesis looks at the problems with traditional
pension fund investment policies. The chapter focuses on how and where
pension funds are currently invested. The majority of investments are in the
top one hundred corporate stocks and bonds. A very small percent of pension
fund assets are invested in mortgages, even though mortgages have had higher
financial
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returns than corporate bonds. This mortgage investment issue reveals an
anomaly in the traditional theory that pension fund portfolio managers use
objective financial criteria in choosing their investments. As we will see, there
are many other problems with the way pension funds are presently managed.
The largest problem is that workers long-term financial, social and
economic interest are often not considered when investing their money. The
second chapter discusses pension funds which have proposed different strategies
to create investments which have added social and economic benefits for
workers, (i.e. housing, jobs). The obstacles to strategic investing are discussed
in the -final section of the second chapter.
The third chapter closely examines a group of pension funds within the
AFL-CIO Building Trades and Construction Union, which have been the most
successful at implementing strategic investing. The building trades union
pension funds have invested in mortgages to. increase jobs in the unionized
sector of the construction industry. Mortgage investments serve the long-term
employment interests of pension fund members, along with providing a secure,
financial rate of return. I chose the building trades pension funds because I
wanted to know why they, in particular, have been successful at implementing
strategic investing. After looking at the building trades cases, three reasons
are identified for their success: 1) mutual incentives for employer and
employees to participate in mortgage investing, 2) joint control, meaning both
employers and employees control investment decisions and, 3) innovative
institutions are used to facilitate their mortgage investing.
The first reason, mutual incentives for employer and employee to
participate in strategic investing, is specific to the building trades and not
generalizable for other pension funds. However, the other two elements, joint
control and innovative institutions, are common to all the other examples of
strategic investing. Thus, employee participation in investment decisions and
the use of alternative financial institutions are identified as key elements in
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supporting strategic pension fund investing.
Having identified these two elements, the final chapter describes, ways
workers can attain more control in investment decisions and use or develop
institutions which are responsive to strategic investment goals. The underlying
argument in this thesis is that workers must participate in the control of
pension fund assets to assure that investments serve their immediate and long-
term interest. Before, this argument can be laid out, we need to understand
how pension funds have evolved and what their institutional and legal apparatus
look like.
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Introduction
NOTES
1. Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum: Speech before the Retirement Income
Conference, September 29, 1978. See AFL-CIO, Building and Construc-
tion Trades Department, Pension Investment Education Program,
Maximum Benefit, Making Investments Do the Job, AFL-CIO, Washington,
D.C., 1980.
2. Thomas Triplett, Investing in Minnesota: A Proposal to Use State
Moneys For Maximum Benefit, Conference on Alternative State and
Local Policies, Washington, D.C., February, 1980, pg. 4.
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CHAPTER 1
PENSION FUND INVESTMENT BACKGROUND
11
HISTORY OF PENSION FUNDS
Pension funds have existed in some form for over a century. The first
private pension plans were offered by large companies in the railroad industry
in the late 1800's. American Express Company, which at that time, was
involved in the railroad business started the first pension plan in 1875. By the
1920's, most major railroads, utility companies, banks and oil companies
initiated pension plans. A few public employee pension funds were also
established around the turn of the century; Massachusetts was the first state to
establish a statewide pension plan for its public employees. All together about
ten percent (10%) of the non-agricultural workforce were technically covered
by an informal pension plan by 1925.
Although four million people may have been covered by a pension plan,
few people ever received a pension. There were no eligibility rules nor were
benefits legally guaranteed. The pension fund was a gratuity from the
employer. Infact, most of the plans before 1929 had a clause that read:
(The employer has) "The right to change from time to time any
of the foregoing provisions and substitute others in their stead
and the right to revise or alter from time to time the plan
under which this pension system has been established or to
abandon said system is hereby reserved ...... The allowances
are voluntary gifts from the company and constitute no
contract and confer no legal rights upon any employees." 2
The early retirement plans were set up and paid for entirely by the
employer. Employers set up these funds, first, to stop employees from shifting
from job to job and thought a retirement fund would create a loyalty incentive.
Second, employers could encourage older workers to leave with the promise of a
pension fund. 3 By paying for the whole pension fund, the employer maintained
control over paying out benefits. Murray Latimer, author of a two-volume book
on early industrial pension funds wrote:
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"If the dominating influence were the desire for a humane
method of retirement, there would seem to be no reason
against the employees contributing to a fund and having a
voice in the administration. That they do not do so leads to
the conclusion that the railroads have preferred to bear the
entire cost in order to retain full control of the schemes. This
policy has the advantages at least in the opinion of the
managements of not complicating relations with trade unions,
retaining full control of retirements and final judgement on
the fulfillment of qualifications, discouraging strikes and
permitting. retirement for the good of the service and the
public safety.' 4
Today, most pension funds, as we will see later on, are totally paid for and
controlled by employers, for many of the same reasons mentioned above.
Organized labor was understandably suspicious about the management
pension fund schemes and tried to set up their own union pension funds.
However, it was difficult for unions to increase dues on their members and as
there were more older workers in unions, the burden of a pension fund was too
expensive for unions. By the depression, practically all union plans had
collapsed.
The Great Depression did change the view about retirement plans.
Pension funds were given more legitimacy because of public acceptance that
individuals could not save enough money by themselves to provide for
retirement. The adoption of Social Security in 1935 further legitimized the
need for retirement funds. World War II also provided another impetus for
companies to institute pension plans. The wage and price controls gave labor a
reason to push for retirement plans because the funds were exempt from
controls. High corporate taxes during the war encouraged companies to make
use of the tax exempt status that pension funds had already received in 1921.
These pension plans were more formal, bound in legal contracts and required to
adhere to certain eligibility rules to keep their tax-exempt status.
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A company, however, did not have to negotiate with the union over a
pension fund until 1949 when the Supreme Court ruled that employers must
bargain on pensions in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act. 5 (Pensions were
defined as part of the structure of wages.) The Court decision gave impetus to
unions to negotiate on pension funds. Collective bagaining and revisions in the
tax code led to continued growth of all types of pension funds, private and
public.
Although the number of workers covered by pension funds increased
during the 1950's and 1960's, few laws existed which protected the retirement
benefits of those workers. Numerous horror stories were told about people
working twenty-four years for a company only to have the company leave town,
without ever paying the worker his or her pension benefits.6 The most famous of
these real-life stories involved the Studebaker plant closing in 1964 which left
most of the eight thousand employees without a pension.
After ten years of hearing testimony from workers who never received
their promised benefits and reports on corporation and union manipulation of
pension fund assets, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA is the most comprehensive pension fund
legislation to date, touching on all aspects of pension fund administration.
The major provisions of ERISA involve the following issues; 1.) minimum
standards for eligibility, 2.) vesting rights (the right to receive a pension once
certain age and service requirements are met, even if the worker is not with
the company at retirement) 3.) a government insurance fund called the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation which the employer pays into to insure
pension benefits in case the company goes out of business, 4.) standards for
disclosure and reporting assets to the Department of Labor and, 5.) sets out
requirements for fiduciary responsibility.
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This last requirement, "fiduciary responsibility" is the legal phrase
dictating pension fund investment decisions. In ERISA a fiduciary is defined as
follows:
"A person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i)
he/she exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management or disposition of its assets (ii)
he/she renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation direct or indirect with respect to any moneys or
other property of such plan or has any authority or
responsibility in the administration of such plan" 7
This defined fiduciary has certain responsibilities to the pension fund as set
forth in Section 404 of ERISA:
"a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participated beneficiaries and
A) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.
B) with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims.
C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan in so far as such documents and
instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
title.n8
Thus, the fiduciary must invest the pension fund assets in the interest of the
beneficiaries and administer it with prudence by diversifying investments. A
fiduciary can be held liable if his or her investments are proven to be
imprudent. There is also a section in ERISA which describes prohibited
investment transactions to prevent self-dealing among trustees. For example,
it it illegal to invest more than ten percent (10%) of pension plan assets in the
employers securities.
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ERISA's funding standards, vesting rights, termination insurance and investment
requirements have all been interpreted and reinterpreted in hundreds of legal
cases since 1975. One entire journal, the Journal of Pension Law and Complian-
ce, is devoted to legal interpretations of ERISA, a highly complex peice of
legislation. ERISA, however, only applies to private pension funds which
represent about sixty five percent. (65%) of total pension fund assets in the
United States.
TYPES OF PLANS
The nine hundred billion dollars in public and private pension fund assets is
held m over five hundred thousand different pension plans. These plans can be
divided into two categories: public sector and private sector funds. Within
public sector funds, there are state and local government pension funds (which
includes teacher, police, fire, public univeristy funds) and federal retirement
funds (i.e. military pensions). Private sector funds are divided into single
employer funds and multi-employer funds. Public and private sectors are
different in their funding mechanisms, their investments and the laws governing
them. The approximate amount of assets in the different types of funds is
shown in Table #1; together, public and private pension funds represent an
enormous source of investments capital.
PUBIJC FUNDS
As the entire state and local government sector has grown, so has their
pension funds. Currently, there are about six thousand six hundred state and
local government retirement plans. The total assets in these funds have grown
from five billion dollars in 1950 to over two hundred billion in 1981. State and
local pension funds are financed by contributions from the employer (the
government) and the employees. The government usually contributes about
eighty percent (80%) and the employee twenty percent (20%) to the fund.
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Private sector funds, in contrast, generally do not have any employee
contributions to the fund.
The vast majority of state and local pension funds are financed through- a
defined-benefit plan as opposed to a defined-contribution plan. A defined
benefit plan means the employer guarantees a certain amount of money to the
employee upon retirement. It is a fixed benefit based on a formula which takes
into account years of service and average annual salary. In a defined
contribution plan, the employer contributes a set amount to the fund, such as
fifty cents an hour per employee, which is estimated to be sufficient to meet
certain pension goals. Investment risk falls on the employer in a defined
benefit plan, because no matter how well investments do, the employer still
must pay out a specified amount to retirees. Conversely, in a defined
contribution plan, investment risk falls on employees because benefits are tied
to the investment performance of the fund. The chart below illustrates who
bears investment risk according to the type of financing of the pension plan.
Financing of the Plan Investment Risk
Defined-Benefit Employer
Defined-Contribution Employee
State or municipal pension fund investment policy is made by retirement
boards whose members are elected or appointed officials and plan participants.
A recent survey or public pension funds concluded: "In most cases the boards
carried ample representation of plan members who were either appointed or
elected by plan participants".9 Usually, retirement boards manage some of the
investments in-house and also contract out investment responsibility to bank
trust departments or insurance companies. Each state has its own statutes
governing public pension fund investments, however, most states set limits on
the amount of equity and real estate their public funds can hold. Recently,
many state legislatures have revised their outdated pension fund restrictions.
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TABLE #1
Approximate Pension Fund Size in 1982
Public Sector:
Private Sector:
State and Local Funds
Federal Funds
Not Collectively Bargained.
Single Employer - Collectively
Bargained
Mulitemployer Funds
TOTAL PENSION FUND ASSETS
size
$250 bil.
$100 bil.
$250 bil.
$250 bil.
$ 50 bil.
$900 bil.
Source: Peoples Business Commission, Washington, D.C.
TABLE #2
The 25 Largest Corporate Pension Systems
(assets in billions)
AT&T Bell System
General Motors
General Electric
Ford Motor
U.S. Steel & Carnegie
IBM
Dupont
Exxon
GT&E
Sears
Shell Oil
Standard Oil (Ind.)
United Technologies
$31.1
$14.1
$ 7.2
$ 6.4
$ 5.5
$ 5.2
$ 4.9
$ 4.3
$ 3.0
$ 3.0
$ 2.8
$ 2.8
$ 2.7
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Rockwell
Boeing
Eastman Kodak
Mobil Oil
Standard Oil, CA
Lockheed
Westinghouse
McDonnell Douglas
Bethlehem Steel
United Air Lines
ARCO
Union Carbide
$2.7
$2.7
$2.7
$2.6
$2.3
$2.2
$2.2
$2.1
$1.9
$1.9
$1.8
$1.7
Source: Labor & Investments, Vol. 1, No. 5, June, 1981.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.-
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Public pension funds usually refers to state and local plans, but there are
also federal retirement funds which cover all federal employees, including those
in the military and Members of Congress. Employees as well as employing
agencies contribute to federal pension funds. All federal pension funds are
defined benefit plans and assets are invested in government securities.
Investments and benefits are controlled by the Federal Civil Service
Retirement System.
PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDS
SINGLE EMPLOYER FUNDS
Single employer funds is the largest category of pension funds and
includes the plans of the majority of large U.S. corporations. Although there
are over five hundred thousand private pension plans, the seventeen largest
cover more than twenty percent (20%) of all private sector workers. 1 0 rable #2
lists the largest single employer pension plans and their current assets.
Two types of private pension plans can be distinguished by their type of
management. The first is the insured plan in which an employer deposits money
with an insurance company, which in turn administers the fund and creates an
annuity contract for each retiree. The second type is a trusteed fund in which
the employer contributions are paid into a bank trust fund which manages the
investments of the pension fund assets. Sixty seven percent (67%) of private
pension plans are trusteed and thirty three percent (30%) are insured plans.
The majority of single employer plans are entirely paid for and controlled
by employers. Employers often prefer a plan to which employees do not
contribute, because they are simpler to administer, cheaper because employee
contributions are not tax deductible and "there is less apparent ground for union
participation in the management of the plan."11 However, unions often do
participate through collective bargaining on issues concerning employer
contributions or benefits to the pension fund. Approximately sixty five percent
(65%) of all workers in private plans are covered by collective bargaining
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agreements. The few single employer funds with defined contribution plans
have union representatives on the trustee board. A trustee board makes
decisions on investment policy, the contributions to the pension fund and
chooses an actuary, but daily investment is administered by in-house staff, an
insurance company, or a bank trust department and more recently private
investment houses.
MULTI-EMPLOYER PLANS
A multi-employer pension plan covers two or more enterprises which pool
pension fund assets into one fund. There are about 7.5 million participants in
multi-employer pension plans.1 2 Firms in competitive industries are typically
involved in multi-employer funds, such as companies in the food industry
apparel, printing and publishing, mining, motor transportation, construction and
certain wholesale trades. These industries have small businesses, seasonal and
irregular employment and employees are typically represented by one large
union. A multi-employer plan benefits employers who would find it too
expensive to fund their own pension plans and benefits workers who can change
employers and transfer their pension credits amoung those employers
participating in the multi-employer plan.
Multi-employer funds are defined contribution plans, whereby the
employer's obligation is limited to a contribution, usually as a percentage of
payroll or cents-per-hour-per employee. The administration of multi-employer
funds is governed by Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which among
other things states that a joint board of trustees on which management and
labor are equally represented must administer the fund. Previous to the Taft-
Hartley Act, unions managed their own pension fund with no employer
representation. The business community and the Republicans in Congress in
1946 - 1947 were very worried about losing control of pension fund capital to
large unions and over President Truman's veto pushed through the Taft-Hartley
Act.13 Unlike single employer funds which usually are corporate adminsitered,
multi-employer plans are jointly administered by unions and employers.
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However, these jointly-administered funds follow the same practice as single
employer funds and turn over the management of the assets to insurance
companies and bank trust departments.
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
Pension fund assets are managed by bank trust departments, insurance
companies, independent investment firms or in-house management. Although
there are thousands of these financial institutions in the United States, just
fifteen bank trust departments, twelve insurance companies and twenty four
private investment firms control and manage ninety percent (90%) of the
approximate eight hundred billion dollars in pension fund assets. From Table #3
we can see that the top ten pension fund managers invest twenty five percent
(25%) of all pension fund assets. The dominance of large banks and insurance
companies in pension fund management is not new. In the 1950's Paul
Harbrecht, commented in Pension Funds and Economic Power: "In the end, the
anatomy of control of the pension trusts may be described quite simply. In
general, financial control has been delegated by employers to the banker
trustees, which exercise considerable power in the capital markets as a result." 14
Pension funds are not only controlled by relatively few financial
institutions, but day-to-day investment decisions are made by very few people
in these institutions. One portfolio manager often invests several pension
funds. The average individual portfolio manager controls two hundred million
dollars. 1 5 Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber , authors of the book
The North Will Rise Again, Pension Politics and Power in the 1980's, described
the power of an individual portfolio manager:
"What is even more disturbing is the number of people who are
ultimately responsible for making all-important decisions on
how and where to invest these funds. The general public has
never heard of Harrison Smith, Willard Wheeler or Al
Thompson, but, as investment managers of Morgan,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Citicorp, they each control
as much investment money as Dupont, Rockefeller, Morgan
and Ford families." 1 6
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TABLE #3
The 25 Largest Pension Managers
(assets in billions)
Managers
1. Equitable Life Assurance
2. Prudential Insurance
3. Aetna Life & Casualty
4. Metropolitan Life
5. Morgan Guaranty Trust
6. Bankers Trust
7. Connecticut Beneral Insurance
8. Mellon Bank
9. Travelers Corp.
10. John Hancock Mutual Life
11. Harris Trust & Savings Bank
12. Citibank
13. Scudder, Stevens & Clark
14. Chase Manhattan Bank
15. State Street Research & Management
16. Fayez Sarofim
17. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
18. -Chemical Bank
19. First National Bank of Chicago
20. Wells Fargo Bank
21. Capital Group
22. First National Bank of Boston
23. Bankers Life
24. Batterymarch Financial
25. Loomis, Sayles & Co.
$_
26.3
22.8
18.5
17.7
14.3
13.6
10.6
9.9
9.9
9.3
8.7
8.0
8.0
7.1
7.1
6.8
6.8
6.6
6.6
6.4
5.8
5.5
5.3
5.3
5.3
Source: Institutional Investor, 1982
Pensions Directory, January, 1982.
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I,
Sometimes, the trustees of a pension fund will give investment guidelines
to their portfolio manager. Usually these guidelines specify the asset mix
between stocks and bonds that the trustes want. More often, though, portfolio
managers are given free reign to invest the funds as he or she sees "prudent".
Greenwich Research Associates, a firm which annually releases a survey of one
thousand pension fund investment managers reported: "corporate executives
are less and less interested in giving explicit instructions to outside pension
investment managers." 1 7 The majority of trustees give full discretion over
investments to their portfolio managers.
Trustees usually do not give their portfolio managers investment
guidelines, but, they do monitor the performance of the fund. Large pension
funds divide their assets among different bank trust departments or investment
firms to create competition for higher rates of return. Trustees can reward or
punish their managers depending upon the return of the pension fund portfolio.
This practice of pitting investment managers against each other has increased
because the rate of return on all pension funds has been notoriously low over
the last fifteen years. The poor performance of pension fund investments,
which will be discussed in a later section of this paper, has also led to a trend
toward in-house management of pensign funds. Some companies have decided
that they can manage at least some of their assets better than banks have in
the past. In-house management is a controversial trend because of the
potential abuses which can arise from mixing company investments with pension
fund investments. The concern is that pension funds tax-exempt status
encourages manipulation of company and pension investments to have the least
annual tax liability. Charles Epstein of Pension's Investment Age, discussing he
mixing of company and pension fund investments, expressed the fear that: "the
pension fund because of its sheer dollar size will no longer be looked upon as an
isolated fund to provide an employee benefit, but as a potential pool to fuel
corporate profits." 18 Manipulation of pension fund assets to further the
company's self interest can occur with in-hoise management as well as outside
investment management.
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A recent case in which the pension fund was illegally manipulated
involved the Grumman Corporation fight against an unfriendly takeover by LTV
Corporation. Grumman Corporation trustees purchased 1,275,000 shares of
Grumman stock to prevent the LTV takeover. Newspaper accounts stated that
the trustees only spent a half hour discussing whether to buy their own
securities and never consulted their own in-house invesment staff. A few
Grumman pension fund beneficiaries sued Grumman and a Judge recently ruled
in the beneficiaries favor concluding that the pension assets were manipulated
"with the knowledge that if the trustees objectives were realized, the pension
plan would have to absorb substantial short-term losses.....trustees have
manifested an inability to separate their corporate loyalty and their loyalty to
the pension plan". 19
The potential for "confusing loyalties" is just as great when investments
of pension fund assets are controlled by a few large banks. There are several
ways that pension fund management by large financial institutions is susceptible
to conflict of interest; these include banks using pension funds to invest in
companies in which the bank has made outstanding loans, a company using a
bank as its manager because the bank is also its primary lender or a major
stockholder and interlocking directorates between companies and banks.
The Industrial Union Department of AFL-CIO did a survey of large
corporatioins and their investment managers, and found that many of the major
financial institutions, such as Morgan Guaranty, Citicorp, Prudential, Rowe
Price own considerable amounts of stock or are debtholders in companies in
which they manage a pension fund.20For example, Morgan Guaranty Trust is a
top stockholder and major debtholder in General Electic as well as one of
General Electric's pension fund investment managers. In addition, Morgan
Guaranty and General Electric have interlocking directorates, where at least
one bank official is on the Board of Directors of General Electric.
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Another startling example of bank-corporate interlocks involves Chase
Manhattan Bank.
"Chase Manhattan jointly manages a $423 million dollar
pension fund for Firestone. Former Chase President, Willard
Butcher, sits on the Firestome Board. Firestone is a
commercial customer of Chase an 1the bank trust department
holds 950,000 shares in Firestone.
Barber and Rifkin ask: "Can Mr. Butcher really look the American public
squarely in the eyes and claim, without qualification, that there is no possibility
of a conflict of interest occuring here?" 2 2
There have been two books put out by the 20th Century Fund, Conflicts of
Interest: Corporate Pension Fund Management and Conflicts of Interest:
Commercial Bank Trust Department, which discuss the way banks use pension
funds to further the banks interests, sometimes at the expense of the pension
fund. A common situation is one in which a bank invests in securities of a
company which is a commercial borrowing client, even if the .company is in a
declining market. Last year, there was a court settlement between Continental
Illinois Bank and the AirlinePilots Association (ALPA) pension fund, which
represents a clear example of bank manipulation of pension fund assets. 2 3
Continental had to pay $1.75 million to the ALPA pension fund in restitution for
lost pension fund money caused by conflict of interest investments.
Continental had invested ALPA's pension fund in stocks of companies they were
commercial lenders to, such as TWA, Penn Cental Company, Management
Assistance, Inc. and U.S. Freight. The suit charged that Continental held onto
the stocks even when the security prices were declining and it was evident that
one of the comanies was facing bankruptcy. The bank served as a creditor for
the declining companies, so they also posessed "inside information" about the
financial status of the company. 2 4 Pensions & Investment Age remarked on the
Continental case: "This suit and others like it have brought up the broader
issues of whether a trustee bank may invest in securities of companies to which
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the bank has made outstanding loans. The questions have not been legally
decided." 25
Of course, banks are not the only ones that have mismanaged pension
funds. There have been notorious cases of union trustees "ripping off" their
members pension fund. Teamsters fund is noted for its corrupt management
which invested -in the underworld businesses of Las Vegas. Although the
Teamsters and the United Mine Workers are the unions most associated with
corrupt pension fund management, there have been other cases of conflicts of
interest with unions and pension fund investment. It is the union abuse of
pension funds, infact, that has received the most coverage and few people
realize the conflicts of interest involved in having a few banks control the
billions of dollars in pension funds.
In summary, trustees of pension funds usually turn over the management
of investments to financial institutions to protect themselves from fiduciary
liability and because the investment bankers are the "experts". Trustees often
try to create competition between investment managers in order to receive
higher rates of return on their portfolio. Since the last fifteen years, the rates
of return on pension funds have been quite low, this has led to a trend toward
more in-house managment of funds. Nevertheless, the vast majority of pension
fund assets are invested by a few bank trust departments, insurance companies
and private investment firms. This concentration of pension fund management
within the elite of the financial community creates conflicts of interest in
investments. These conflicts stem from the close ties banks have with
corporations as either a lender, stockholder, or director on a Board, or all three.
The pension fund assets can too easily be manipulated to serve the interests of
large banks. Rifkin and Barber discuss the dependence banks have on pension
funds for their business:
"Major banks are controlling tens of billions of dollars of
pension funds. These moneys are increasingly providing these
institutions with the primary instrument through which they
carry on their overall business dealings. The pension fund has
become indispensible to their operations and success.
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Therefore, it is absurd to continue to harbor the myth that
their sole and exclusive interest is the welfare and benefit of
the fund itself. The fact is that the banks are not the
instrument serving the fund. Rather the fund is the instrument
serving the banks." 2 6
It is evident that a significant portion of America's new investment
capital is managed by a few people in banks or insurance companies with very
little oversight. These financial institutions invest pension funds because they
are presumed to be the experts. In the next section, we will look at where the
funds have actually been invested and what the performance of pension funds
have been while in the hands of the experts.
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INVESTMENT POLICY
Banks and insurance companies, the two financial institutions which
control pension funds, have different investment policies regarding pension fund
assets. State and local funds also emphasize different types of investments
from private insured or trusteed funds. Table #4 compares the mix of assets
that trusteed and insured pension funds have had in the past and currently hold.
Insurance companies and trusteed pension funds are compared, not only because
insurance companies invest over thirty percent (30%) of private pension funds,
but also because the two institutions have similar financial needs. Both make
their investments with a long-term horizon, are risk averse and pay benefits in
the same manner. Thus, one would think that the investment portfolios of
banks who invest pension funds and insurance companies would resemble each
other. However, as Table #4 shows, banks emphasize equity investments while
insurance companies and public funds invest more in bonds. A glaring
difference between the types of funds is that insurance companies have
invested approximately thirty percent (30%) of their assets in mortgages while
banks hold a meager one percent to three percent in mortgage investments.
These differences originate from historical, institutional and legal restraints on
investments.
The first part of this section discusses the historical investment trends of
trusteed, insured and public pension funds. The remainder of this section
focuses on the small amount of mortgage investments by pension funds. The
mortgage investment issue is interesting because it reveals an anomaly in the
theory that portfolio managers use objective, neutral criteria in choosing
investments from the menu of possibilities. In the previous section, we saw how
bank trust departments can have biases toward certain investments because of
ties to companies they invest in and interlocking directorships. In this section,
we- again see institutional management biases which favor certain assets, such
as stocks and ignore mortgage investments, for no apparent market reason.
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The institutional management bias explanation for lack of mortgage
investments is backed up by three facts which will be discussed in this section
and have been already articulated in Ken Rosen's paper, The Role of Pension
Funds in Housing Finance? 7 First, as mentioned, insurance companies with
comparable financial needs to pension funds have invested a much larger
proportion of their assets in mortgages. Second, the economic characteristics
of mortgages make them desirable investments. Third, public pension funds and
jointly trusteed funds have a higher proportion of assets in mortgages than
private trusteed funds. Before discussing the mortgage investment issue
further, it is important to review the historical trends of pension fund
investments.
INVESTMENT TRENDS
Before 1930, most private pension plan investments were managed by the
sponsoring company; there were few insured or trusteed funds. Most of the
investments were in bonds of the sponsoring company with about ten percent
(10%) of assets invested in government securities. By 1940, insured plans were
used more and both types of plans invested a large percent of their funds in
government securities. The World War II effort stimulated this increased
investment in federal securities.
After World War II, the number of insured and trusteed plans and their
assets grew substantially. Trusteed funds began switching their investments
from government securities and bonds to common stock in large, established
companies where there were higher rates of return. As stocks remained a solid
investment through the 1950's and the 19601s, there was a large shift in trusteed
funds away from corporate bonds toward corporate equity. In 1946, forty one
percent (41%) of trusteed funds were in U.S. securities, twenty five percent
(25%) in bonds and only eight percent (8%) in stocks. By 1965, only four percent
(4%) of assets were invested in government securities, thirty percent (30%) in
bonds and fifty six percent (56%) in stocks. Today, pension funds are top
stockholders in the largest companies in the U.S.
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TABLE #4
Distribution. of Pension Trusts, 1946-1980, Selected Years
.YPe of Asset
1946 9965 
~970 
- 975 muo --8 -Bii. Percen il. Percent il. Percent i . Percent Bii. Percent _B1. Percenr
ercet Bit. pr Per et Bil. Percent
Market Value
:ash and Deposits
.S. Covt Secorities
orporate 4 Other Bonds
cock
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Total Reserves
1.5
.9
.3
.8
41.7
25.0
. 8.3
22 2
22.2
$3.b 100.02
$.4
2.9
7.7
6.1
.3
.6
2.2%
16.1
42.8
33.9
1.7
3.3
$.5
2.7
14.6
16.5
1.3
1.4
1.3%
7.3
39.4
44.5
3.5
3.8
$.9
2.9
21.9
40.8
3.4
3.0
$18.1 100.0% $37.1 100.0% $72.9
1.7%
4.0
30.0
56.0
4.7
4..1
$1.8
3.0
29.9
67.1
3.5
4.4
100.0% $104.7
1.72
2.9
23.8
64.1
3.3
4.2
$3.0
11.1
34.,5
88.6
2.1
6.3
100.02 $145.6
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ash and Deposits
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$.4 2.5%
3.0 18.5
7.9 48.8
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.3 1.8
.6 3.7
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2.7
15.7
11.5
1.3
1.4
$16.1 100.0% $33.1
1.5%
8.2
47.4
34.7
3.9
4.2
$ .9
3.0
23.1
25.9
3.4
2.9
100.0% $59.2
1.5Z
5.1
39.0
43.8
5.7
4.9
$1.8
3.0
29.7
53.5
4.2
4.9
100.0% $97.0
1.9%
3.1
30.6
55.1.
4.3
5.0,
$3.0
10.8
3"'. 8
84.8
2.4
6.4
100.0% $145.2
2.1%
7.6
23.7
60.8
1.4
4.3
$9.3
26.3
60.0
175.8
3.8
22.0
99.9% $297.2
2.1% $9.3
7.4 28.3
26.0 63.9
58.4 129.8
1.7 4.1
4.4 21.5
100.0% $256.9
Distribution of Assets of Pensio Plans Funded Through Life Insurers, 1946-1980, Selected 
Years
194619510195171951B
Type of Asset Oil. Percent Ba. Percent bil. Percent oil. Percent BiI. Percent Percent Bi. Percent
Cash and Deposits a 1.6% $0.2 1.4% $0.2 1.1% $0.3 1.0 $0.4 0.9% $0.5 0.7% $1.0 0.6%
U.S. Cov't Securities $1.4 45.6 1.1 9.8 1.1 5.6 0.9 3.4 0.9 2.3 1.6 2.2 5.9 3.6
Corporate & Other Bonds .9 28.9 5.0 44.6 8.4 44.6 11.4 41.9 15.9 38.5 28.4 39.3 65.3 39.7
Stock .1 2.6 0.5 4.1 .8 4.3 1.6 5.9 3.2 7 .7b 7.2 10 . 0 b 18.3 11 1b
Mortgages .5 15.1 3.8 33.5 6.8 36.1 10.6 38.9 15.2 )7.0 3.0 31.9 46.1 28.0
Other Assets .2 6.2 0.7 6.6 1.5 8.2 2.4 8.9 5.6 13.6 11.4 15.8 28.0 17.0
Total Assets $3.1 100.0% $11.3 100.0% 18.8% 100.0% $27.3 100.02. $41.2 100.0% $72.2 100.0% $164.6 100.02
Source: Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, Brookings Institute, Washington, 
D.C., 1982.
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83S
20.C
59.2
1.3
7.4
100.C%
3.6%
11.C
24.J
50.5
1.6
8.4
100.0%
While trusteed funds accumulated equity investments, insured pension
funds maintained a fixed income or bond oriented portfolio. State regulations
governed the investments of life insurance companies and limited the amount of
equity they could hold. In New York, for example, where most life insurance
companies were domiciled, there was a three percent (3%) limit on the amount
of equity an insurance company could invest in. Pension plans increasingly were
managed by bank trusts in which there was more freedom over investments.
Insurance company investments are still regulated by states.
There are not only state laws limiting the amount of equity investment by
life insurance companies, but also regulations within the industry. There are
standards set by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners which
dictate the way life insurance companies make contributions to a Mandatory
Securities Valuation Reserve (MSVR) and the amount of contribution is
determined by the investment class (rating) of their assets; 2 8 An insurance
company contributes less to the MSVR if it has investments in high-grade long-
term bonds. This system discourages low grade bonds or, common stock
investments. For at least these two reasons, state regulations and industry
standards, life insurance companies have emphasized bonds in their portfolios
while trusteed pension funds have invested in common stocks.
In 1963, a law was passed allowing life insurance companies to set up
separate accounts to manage pension funds. These separate accounts can invest
in common stock without any restrictions. Approximately seventeen percent
(17%) of insured pension assets are held in separate accounts29 The rest of
insured pension assets are combined with life insurance assets. Even counting
these separate accounts, life insurance companies invest only about ten percent
(10%) in corporate equity, in contrast to trusteed pension funds which have sixty
percent (60%) in stocks. Like insurance company investments, state and local
pension funds have most of their assets in corporate bonds. Many states also
have legal restrictions limiting the amount of equity their public pension fund
holds, although some of these limits have been changed recently. During the
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last fifteen years public pension funds have increased their investments in
corporate stock. In 1965, public pension funds only invested about four percent
(4%) in stocks. Today they have around twenty percent (20%) in stocks. The
combined stockholdings of public funds make them among the top five
stockholers in over forty percent (40%) of the Fortune 500 companies. 30
California's state pension funds alone have thirty billion dollars in assets and
are the fourth largest stockholder in Bank of America, fifth largest stockholder
in Chase Manhattan Bank, seventh in ARCO and overall the nation's sixth
largest institutional investor.3 1
In brief, there are differences between insured, trusteed and public
pension funds and their allocation of their assets between equity and fixed
income investments. While, commercial banks have leaned toward equity
investments, insurance companies and public funds have traditionally steered a
more conservative course and emphasized fixed income investments. Clearly,
though, insurance companies and more recently public pension funds differ most
from trusteed funds in the amount of their mortgage investments.
MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS
Given the similarities in financial needs of insurance companies and
pension funds, it is curious that insurance companies have thirty percent (30%)
of their assets in mortgages and non-insured private funds only have two
percent (2%) in mortgages.* Along with comparable financial needs, life
insurance companies and banks trust departments which invest pension funds,
have similar industry structures. Like commerical banks, the life insurance
industry is characterized by a high degree of concentration with a few firms
*Insured pension assets in separate accounts have only one percent in
mortgages.
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dominating the industry. Among 1,762 life insurance companies in the United
States, the top five firms have forty four percent (44%) of the assets and forty
two percent (42%) of the industry's mortgage investments. 3 2 It is not the
differences in the competitive structure of the banking and insurance industries
which makes insurance companies invest more in mortgages. There are,
however, other institutional as well as legal and historical reasons for this
curious difference in mortgage investments.
State legal restrictions on the amount of equity insurance companies
could hold encouraged the companies to diversify their debt portolios. These
legal barriers helped to promote insurance company investments in mortgages.
Since the early 1900's life insurance companies have invested about thirty
percent (30%) of their assets in real estate mortgages. During the Depression
and World War II, their mortgages investments dropped: in the early 1930's
people had no money to pay their mortgages, so life insurance companies were
forced to take title of property and during the war, there was little domestic
construction. After the war, though, there was a need for housing which
increased the demand for mortgage credit3 3 Life insurance companies filled this
demand because home mortgages offered competitive rates of return.
Annually, life insurance companies increased the percent of their assets they
invested in mortgages.
In the 1960's, life insurance companies switched from residential mortgage
investments to commercial mortgages. Alicia Munnell, a Federal Reserve Bank
economist, writes: "This increased interest in commercial mortgage lending
can be attributed, among other factors, to the attractive yield and the
relatively short effective maturities of commercial mortgages (three to five
years)." 3 4 Commercial mortgages tend to be on large income producing
properties which have higher expected yields than residential mortgages.
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Life insurance companies also developed relationships with mortgage
bankers which facilitated their commerical and residential mortgage
investments. A recent article in Mortgage Banker states:
"Recognizing the local nature of real estate, insurance
companies set up regional offices or established correspondent
relationships with local mortgage bankers to analyze
investments and monitor important developments in the
community and in conjunction with servicing the loan or
identifying potential investment opportunities. The insurance
companies developed a learning curve involving local people
who could continuously deliver intelligent investment
opportunities and services. The correspondents often helped
shape the investment policy of an institution. And twenty five
years of problem-solving through changing economic cycles
has expanded their knowledge and skills in analyzing and
dealing with different properties." 5
Commercial bank trust departments have never cultivated this link with
mortgage bankers, because portfolio managers have not been interested in
mortgage investments.
Many reasons have been offered as to why pension funds have invested
very little in any mortgages and especially home mortgages. The reasons most
often cited are: the small difference between mortgage and bond yield, default
risk, illiquidity, lack of staff expertise, administration costs and inadequate
inflation protection. 3 6 Ken Rosen, in his paper, The Role of Pension Funds in
Housing Finance refutes many of the "excuses" given for pension funds lack of
investment in home mortgages. For example, Rosen shows that between the
years 1960 and 1974 conventional mortgage interest rates have been 1.5% higher
than Aaa bond yields. Since 1974, both conventional and FHA mortgages have
maintained higher yields than high grade bonds, as shown in Table #5. The rate
of return has not prevented pension trusts from investing in residential
mortgages.
Risk as well as return is an important element in choosing investments.
With mortgages, there is interest rate risk and default risk. Interest rate risk
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ATABLE #5
Yields on Mortgages and Corporate Bonds, 1960-1981
Mortgages
FHA Insured Conventional
6.24% 6.08%
5.86% 5.81
5.75 5.71
5.46 5.84
5.45 5.78
5.47 5.74
6.38 6.14
6.55 6.33
7.21 6.83
8.29 7.66
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
8.27.
7.60
7.45
7.78
9.71
8.75
8.76
8.80
9.30
10.48
12.25
14.16
Corporate Bonds
Aaa Baa
4.41% 5.19%
4.35 5.08
4.33 5.02
4.26 4.86
4.40 4.83
4.49 4.87
5.13 5.67
5.51 6.23
6.18 6.94
7.03 7.81
8.04 9.11
7.39 8.56
7.21 8.16
7.44 8.24
8.57 9.50
8.83 10.61
8.43 9.75
8.02 8.97
8.73 9.49
9.63 10.69
11.94 13.67
14.17 16.04
Source: Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, Brookings
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1982.
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9.03
7.70
7.53
8.19
9.55
9.19
8.82
8.68
9.70
10.87
13.42
16.29
TABLE #6
Total Rates of Return and Standard Deviation of Returns for FHA
Mortgages and Other Assets, 1960-1980 and 1970-1980
Total Return, 1960-1980 Total Return-. 1970-1980
Standard Standard
Asset Average Minimum Maximum Deviation Average Minimum Maximum- Deviation
FHA Mortgages 5.1% -6.7% 16.1% 5.2% 5.9% -6.7% 16.1% 6.6%
Common Stocks 8.0 -26.5 37.2 17.0 8.0 -26.5 37.2 20.0
Long-Term Corporate Bonds 3.6 -8.1 18.4 7.0 5.4 -3.1 18.4 9.0
Long-Term Government Bonds 3.1 -9.2 16.8 7.0 4.6 -1.2 16.8 7.0
U.S. Treasury Bills 5.4 2.1 11.2 2.0 6.8 3.8 11.2 2.0
Source: Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C.,
due for publication June 1982.
is often measured by the standard deviation of the asset's rate of return in a
time series. The standard deviation on the rate of return over time shows the
dispersion around the expected return on an asset, in this case, mortgages.
Table #6 compares the standard deviations on the rates of return for
mortgages, stocks and bonds. Stocks are by far the most risky of the
investments and their higher returns during some periods takes into account the
risk involved in making corporte equity investments. One expects bonds and
mortgages to be less risky, but the risk with mortgages is below that of both
types of bonds. These low risk indicators for mortgages have been in times of
high inflation, where one would expect that mortgages would incur more
interest rate risk losses. 37
Default risk is the possibility that the borrower will not pay the principal
or interest or both on the mortgage debt. The type of insurance or government
guarantee, the credit of the borrower, loan-to-value-ratio and the value of the
property are key elements in determining default risk. In the case of FHA or
VA home mortgages, which have government guarantees, there is very little
default risk. The lender bears practically no risk in case of foreclosure.
Conventional mortgages have a slightly higher risk of default, but usually
private insurance protects the mortgages from the first twenty to twenty-five
percent loss, with value of the property protecting the remaining loan portion
from loss. 3bften, the probability of default risk with a conventional mortgage
depends upon the value of the property and the credit of the borrower.
The recent development of mortgage-backed securities and mortgage
pools has mitigated many of the issues around risk. With a pass-through
mortgage-backed security, an investor, in this case a pension fund, buys a share
in a mortgage pool. The amortization of the principal and interest due on the
share in the mortgage pool is passed on to the investor each month. The most
common type of pass-through mortgage-backed security is offered by the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). GNMA securities
37
represent a share in a pool of FHA and VA insured mortgages. GNMA mortgage
pools, called "Ginnie Maes" are government insured, fully guaranteed by the
"full faith and credit of the United States government". Thus, there is no risk
of loss by foreclosure with a Ginnie Mae security.
There are also mortgage-backed securities offered by quasi-government
agencies like Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA/"Fannie Maes")
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC/"Freddie Macs").
These securities are backed by the faith and credit of the agencies, and have a
slightly higher risk. Conventional mortgage pools are usually covered by
private insurance to minimize any default risk. Ken Rosen, who also wrote
about Canada's mortgage investments, sums up the risk issue saying: "In neither
country (U.S. or Canada) can risk explain the relatively small scale of mortgage
investment by the pension funds. The portfolio diversification implied by a risk
averting strategy should involve diversification over types of assets not just
diversification within one asset type.! 39
The other reasons cited for pension funds lack of mortgage investment
also do not hold much weight. For example, illiquidity should not be much of an
issue for pension funds since their very purpose is long-term finance.
Nevertheless, amortization on a mortgage provides a certain amount of built-in
liquidity. Mortgage-backed securities, such as GNMA's guarantee monthly
payments from the amortization of the principal and the interest due on the
share in the mortgage pool. GNMA's also have high liquidity because they can
easily be traded on the secondary market.
Mortgages are traditionally associated with high transaction, information
and administration costs. Information costs can increase because there is no
daily price quotes on real estate mortgages, like there is in the stock market.
The mortgage market is assumed to be geographic specific which also can raise
information costs. Mortgage investments do require a certain amount of staff
expertise which may not be needed in publicly offered bonds. However,
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many of these transaction costs of mortgagees have been eliminated by
mortgage bankers or brokers. A mortgage banker originates mortgages, resells
the loan to an institution and services the loan for a fee (.1% - .5%). Even
adding on the mortgage broker service fee, the net yield on mortgages still
compares favorably with other assets. 0 Good mortgage bankers are also aware
of local mortgage markets and their unique qualtities which mitigates some of
the geographic barriers.
Mortgage-backed securities require fewer administrative costs than direct
mortgage investing. The investor does not deal with loan origination or
servicing of the mortgage. The administrative process is similar to buying a
bond from a broker but the security is backed by property instead of the capital
of a corporation. It is not clear that mortgage instruments today have greater
transaction costs than other conventional securities. Also, mortgages are no
less of a hedge against inflation than other securities. Stocks used to be
considered an inflation hedge, but after the 1970's drop in the stock market,
mortgages are as least as good as a protection against inflation. A variable
rate mortgage would be an excellent inflation hedge for the investor.
So, if none of the reasons adequately explain why trusteed pension funds
have so little of their assets in mortgages, why have the funds steered clear of
mortgages? Rosen, Munnell and others attribute pension funds lack of
mortgage investing to institutional factors relating to the management of
pension funds. The first institutional barrier to mortgage investing comes from
large commercial bank trust departments that are oriented towards stock and
bond investments. Bank trustees lack knowledge about mortgage investments.
Ken Rosen quotes one fund manager who states:. "You do what makes you
comfortable. . . which means stocks and bonds.'41 Bank trustees have never
acquired any staff expertise or education about mortgages and are reluctant to
change their traditional investment practices, even if mortgage investments
would increase the rate of return and diversify a pension fund portfolio.
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A second and related institutional barrier concerns the specific
investment managers who tend to emphasize short-term portfolio gains rather
than long-term returns. In both bank trust departments and large corporations
with internal management of pension funds, the postion of the pension fund
manager represents a step on the corporate ladder for upwardly mobile young
executives2These young pension fund managers need to quickly prove that they
are capable money managers and thus, tend to exaggerate short-term
investments. The pension officer who decides that a long-term investment
policy is important may not be seen as aggressive enough. This short-term
performance orientation promotes stock investments which are expected to
appreciate quickly.43 The focus on stock investments because of the institutional
setting of the pension manager discourages mortgage investments.
Even, people within the institutional investor community query why
pension funds have not taken advantage of mortgage investments, expecially
mortgage-backed securities. A recent article in the trade magazine,
Pension World states:
"By any measurment, mortgages represent "big money". The
"big money"' has spawned big financing ideas. Mortgage-
backed securities, introduced by the Government National
Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae") in 1970, now amount to
$116.6 billion with new originations at the level of $20.6 a year
. . . . Thus far, however, pension funds have participated in
this market in only a minor way." 44
The authors ask:
"Does this suggest a "big misunderstanding" on the part of
pension fund managers? Perhaps, the funds have remained at
the sidelines out of prudence, waiting for greater familiarity
with these instruments to develop. Whatever the reasons, the
figures do suggest that there is considerable room for growth
of pension fund investment in the decade of the 1980's. For
the astute pension fund manager, the pass-through security
offers the potential of superior returns." 45
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They conclude by saying:
"Taken altogether, mortgage-backed securities represent "big
money" - money invested in the nation's homes and producing
steady, predictable income that should have strong appeal for
the pension fund investor." 46
These statements reinforce the notion that it is not the problems with the
mortgage instrument itself that has prevented pension fund participation, but
rather institutional factors in the traditional management of pension funds.
Many public pension funds and jointly trusteed funds have overcome
institutional management biases against mortgages by having explicit
investment policies to promote mortgage investments. State pension funds
have also overcome legal barriers to invest in mortgages. Until recently, most
states had percent limits on how much of their fund could be invested in
mortgages and some states still have these restrictions. Public pension funds
have approximaely ten percent (10%) of their assets in home mortgages. Public
pension funds have most of their mortgage investments with government
agencies in pass-through securities, through GNM A's. The direct mortgage
investments are usually FHA or VA loans. California has twenty six percent
(26%) of its portfolio in mortgages investments, with most of them being in-
state mortgages. 4 7
Recently, some states have taken advantage of a mortgage-bakced
security program offered by Morgan Guarantee Investment Corporation (MGIC). 4 8
In this program, the state pension fund buys a mortgage pass-through security
and forms residential mortgage pools with state lenders. For example,
Massachusetts state pension fund made nineteen million dollars available to
MGIC to buy residential mortgages originated by twelve Massachusetts banks.
This past summer the interest rate on the mortgage pool was 14.7%. MGIC is
now working with pension funds in the state of South Carolina ($35 million)
Kansas ($15 million) Michigan ($67 million), Alabama ($44 million) and New york
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($175 million) and the city pension fund of Philadelphia ($20 million). The MGIC
mortgage securities have the potential to target housing investment within a
state or city. A few state pension funds have also started programs which
provide home mortgages to state employees. A couple of the more innovative
state programs will be discussed in the second chapter of this paper.
While public pension funds have taken advantage of mortgage-backed
securities, multi-employer funds have made more direct mortgage loans than
other types of funds. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union pension fund
financed many New York City cooperatives in the 1930's. By far the most
mortgage loans as a percent of pension fund portfolios has been made by large
construction union funds. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW), Carpenters & Joiners, Teamsters and Plumbers and Pipfitters Union
have historically had over twenty five percent (25%) of their pension funds
invested in mortgages and real estate loans.
It is no coincidence that public pension funds and multi-employer funds
are forging ahead in financing mortgages. As well as providing a competitive
financial rate of r'eturn, mortgage investments offer "social benefits" to these
pension fund members (i.e. housing). Public pension funds can target mortgage
investments to their state or city, adding needed housing units to a particular
area. The pension fund money remains in the state rather than exported to
sonewhere else and the mortgage investments can stimulate housing
construction.
The social benefit of mortgage investment for union construction funds is
job creation. The more mortgage investment a construction pension fund makes
in a particular area, the more construction jobs there may be in that area.
Public pension funds and some multi-employer funds are beginning to evaluate
the social rate of return and performance of their pension fund portfolio, along
with the first priority of a pension fund, a secure, optimal financial rate of
return.
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PENSION FUND PERFORMANCE
The performance of pension funds is traditionally measured by the total
rate of return on the fund assets. Recently, workers have looked at another
facet of pension fund performance, the "social return", which covers the social
and economic consequences of their fund investments. The social return
measures the degree to which investments are consistent with the interests of
the workers who own the fund. This section focuses on the financial rate of
return while the next chapter concentrates on the social and economic
consequences of pension fund investments.
FINANCIAL RATE OF RETURN
We have already alluded to the fact that pension funds have had poor
financial rates of return; Tables #7 and #8 present the evidence. The first
table compares the rates of return for pension trusts and insurance companies.
The second table adds the rate of return by investment firms and uses different
time intervals. The second table, from A.G. Becker, Inc., a firm which
monitors pension fund investment returns, shows the median return for pension
funds was 4.1% for the fiften year period from 1965 - 1979. The rate of
inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index, during the same fifteen years
was 6.2%. If 1980 is included, the median return rises to 5.5% and the inflation
rate becomes 6.8%. During the recent five year period on Becker's table, the
median return was 2.5% after accounting for inflation.
Pension funds have not only lagged behind the inflation rate but also
performed below the stock market, measured by the Standard and Poor 500
index (S&P 500). The S&P 500 is a measurement of the rate of return on a
representative cross section of all stocks on the New York Stock Exchange.
During the years 1966 - 1976, the annual return on pension fund equity
investments was thirty three percent (33%) below the S&P index. During those
years, the annual average S&P index was 6.6% while banks only averaged a 4.4%
return.4 9'he period beween 1972 - 1976 was worse with the S&P index return at
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ATABLE #7
Rate of Return for Pension Trusts and
Life Insurance Companies, 1960-1980
Pension Trusts
6.3%
15.0
-2.6
11.1
11.3
8.6
-5.1
11.9
7.6
-5.8
5.6
16.1
17.2
-18.4
-21.3
22.2
12.1
-2.2
4.1
4.2
24.4
Insurance Companies
4.1%
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
5.0
5.1
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Average Annual Rate of Return
1960-1980
1960-1970
1970-1980
5.3
5.4
5.6
5.9
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.9
7.3
7.7
8.0
5.2
5.5
4.9
5.6
4.6
6.5
Source: Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, Brookings
Institute, Washington, D.C., publication date, June, 1982.
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TABLE #8
Median Returns for Pension Funds By Manager Type (annualized)
15-year 10-year 5-year 3-year
(65-70) (70-79) (75-79) (77-79) (79)
Total Fund 4.1% 10.6% 13.1%
Bank & Trust Companies 3.6 3.7 10.4 4.6 12.2
Investment Counselors 4.1 4.2- 11.6 6.4 16.6
Insurance Companies NA 3.8 11.6 7.2 14.4
Equities
Bank & Trust Companies 3.8 3.0 13.0 5.4 19.4
Investment Counselors 4.4 3.8 15.1 8.3 24.4
Insurance Companies NA 4.0 13.6 6.9 22.2
S & P Index 5.6 5.9 14.8 5.4 18.7
Bonds
Bank & Trust Companies NA 7.1 6.7 2.2 1.3
Investment Counselors NA 6.4 6.3 2.1 1.5
Insurance Companies NA 6.2 6.5 2.8 1.2
Source: A.G. Becker Inc., Funds Evaluation and Planning Services, in Pensions & Investments,
(now titled Pensions & Investment Age), May 12, 1980.
4.9% compared to pension fund trust returns at 1%.50 The last five years in
Becker's sample, 1975 - 1979, still show the S&P index outperforming private and
public pension funds, as Table #8 indicates.
These poor rates of return have wiped out a lot of pension fund assets. In
1974, when the stock market plummetted, pension funds lost thirty billion
dollars51 During 1973 - 1974, some pension funds lost thirty to forty percent (30 -
40%) of their assets1 2 Since most pension funds are defined-benefit plans,
employers had to make up for the lost assets. However, in the last five years,
more employers have switched to defined-contribution plans, so the employee
bears the brunt of the investment losses. 53
Private non-insured pension funds, especially, have lost assets during
periods of decline in the stock market and make some gains when the market
does well. In contrast, public funds have done better than private funds during
bear stock markets and worse in the face of deteriorating bond markets.5 4Over
long time periods, public and private pension funds have performed
approximately the same.
Also, from a long-term perspective, the different types of managers of
pension funds - banks, insurance companies, and investment firms - have had
equally poor rates of returns on pension fund investments. Bank trust
department returns have been more volatile reflecting their emphasis on
equities. Recently, investment firms have outperformed bank trust
departments and insurance companies, as Becker's table indicates. In 1979,
investment firms had a rate of return of 16.6%, compared with 4.4% for
insurance companies and 12.2% for banks. A study of bank-administered
comingled-pension funds (pension funds from smaller companies which are
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merged for investment purposes) also found that large bank trusts had very low
investment returns, compared to other investors and market rates 5 This study
concludes:
"The performance of (bank) comingled-equity funds has been
inferior to what would have been acheived by an unmanaged
portfolio or similar risk . . . the allocation of these (pension)
funds to bank trust departments is at a sub-optimum level.
Thus, they are partially misallocated, since an unmanaged
portfolio of similar risk would have performed better.,, 5 6
The research and statistics on pension asset performance point to the fact
that fund managers have consistently performed below the market: if pension
fund trustees had randomly put their money in across section of stock on the
New York Stock Exchange, they would have done better than the well-paid bank
managers. In fact, this random method, called market indexing, may become a
popular tool for investing. Barber & Rifkin predict computers will take the jobs
of money managers in the future:
"It is not surprising then, that in recent years there has been a
movement a foot to replace these so-called money experts
altogether with computers, the notion being that a well-
programmed machine can do better in the market than an
$80,000 a year investment analyst. Market indexing is
becoming increasingly popular in light of the embarrasing
performance of professional money managers .... What this
means is that all of the money banks invest in market research
and high-paid analysts is a futile exercise. Proponents of
market indexing have demonstrated that a well-programmed
computer can beat the pros almost all the time.n57
Why have the experts had such low financial rates of return on pension
funds that a computer could outperform them? There is not one simple answer
that accounts for the poor performace record, but, several explanations have
been offered, each placing the blame somewhere else. One explanation is that
pension funds never recovered from the fall in the stock market in 1973 - 1974
and just as the market was recovering, pension fund managers were less inclined
to invest in equities due to ERISA. This assumes that ERISA created a trend of
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conservative investing, away from equities and toward fixed income securities,
right when the stock market was doing well and the bond market was in decline.
Recent studies, however, have shown that ERISA has not had adverse effects on
private pension fund portfolios and if anything, may have had "a beneficial
effect in encouraging more diversification and less concentration in high value
stocks"?. 8 One reason for poor performance is bad timing of investments or
"missing the market", but this has less to do with legal barriers (ERISA) and
more to do with management decisions.
The second and third explanations blame the management of pension funds
for their poor financial performance. The second explanation says that pension
fund managers have missed the market because they switch money managers
too often. 9 In the 1950's and the 1960's, big banks which dominate the
management of pension funds, were invested in blue chip stocks. In 1973 and
1974, when blue chip stock prices fell, many big corporations took their money
out of the banks and put it with smaller investment firms or in-house staff. The
smaller firms were called "market timers" because they were supposed to
predict when the market would go up and down. However, these investment
firms did not predict the upward turn in stocks in 1975 and 1976 and pension
funds lost again. An article in Harpers magazine illustrates the recent market
missing by pension funds:
"In the late 1970's pension funds continued to move away from
big banks, just as institutions like Citibank, Bankers Trust and
Morgan Guaranty, which had been slow to adapt to new
economic realities, were beginning to show more favorable
results. By 1980, corporate pension executives became
fascinated with firms that claimed to be experts in real
estate. This came in response to real estate prices, which had
been sky-rocketing for five years. Unfortunately, by the time
pension funds began buying warehouses and office buildings,
real estate prices had begun to peak."6 0
The agrument presented in Harpers blames the poor performace on the
short-term perspective of corporate pension fund officers. Stan Luxembourg,
the author of the Harpers article writes:
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"The blame for these (poor) results can be placed on a system
of investment that encourages pension managers to act like
bureaucrats, not professional investors. While the professional
investor seeks to maximize earnings, the bureaucrat is
primarily concerned with a secure job." 61
The pension fund officer is a big step on the corporate ladder and the
officer must prove his or her money management skills quickly to advance.
This leads to short-term horizons in investments, "novice investing" and often
missing the market because the fund is not managed to produce good long-term
results. This explanation implies that switching investments too often has
sacrificed higher yields for pension funds. More rigorous research on the
investment behavior of pension funds is needed to verify this explanation.
Randy Barber and Jeremy Rifkin offer a third explanation for the poor
returns on pension funds. They make a convincing argument that pension funds
have been used by banks, insurance companies and investment firms to prop up
the stock market. As financing corporate needs has become increasingly
tighter, there has been pressure on pension funds to pick up the equity
financing, even if the stock market is not the locus of the best return on
investment. In the last ten years, retained corporate earnings, the traditional
source of new capital investment, has declined due to foreign competition, high
costs of renewing plants and equipment, increasing energy costs, and other
factors. 6 2Although, there are many more facets to this story, the crux of the
issue, is that pension funds have been used to fill the capital gap for
corporations. While millions of Americans left the stock market, pension funds
remained because they are a captive pool of capital for the business and
financial community. Jason Epstein, of the New-York Review of Books, writes:
"Employee pension funds were used to prop up the market while much of the
smart money got out more or less intact. 6 3
The pressure on pension funds to bail out corporations has increased as
financing becomes more expensive. Recently, pension funds have been buying
millions of dollars worth of real estate from corporations. Pooled pension fund
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accounts of large insurance companies, like Metropolitan, Prudential and Aetna
are buying corporate real estate such as the Pan Am Building and General
Motors headquarters, both in New York. Pensions and Investment Age, a
magazine for the financial investor community, calls these pension real estate
investments a "bailout for corporate America".
'Pension funds are bailing out some of America's largest
corporations by buying their real estate. Some large
corporations needing cash but trying to avoid high interest
rates in the debt markets are selling some of their properties
to pension fund investors.n 64
Pension funds are hoping that these real estate properties will provide
diversification and appreciate. If pension funds hold on to the real estate, past
slump periods, they could realize high capital gains. However, some investors
wonder if pension funds have not entered the real estate market too late05A
warning came from Franz Fischer, a University of Southern California professor
who said that pension funds are acting like "Arab princes", purchasing
properties with cosmetic appeal and sizzle instead of value.6 6
Corporations are relying on pension funds to provide much of the long-
term capital they desperately need. A March, 1982 Business Week article, titled
"The Perilous Hunt for Financing" states:
"Pension funds covering state and local government employees
are expected to pick up $8 billion of the net new corporate
debt this year, while corporate pension plans will sop up about
$3 billion. Pension funds are also expected to absorb most of
the new equities . . . Pension funds, flush with cash, will be
eager buyers of stock offerings expected this year . . . Public
and private funds which typically buy about half of the new
corporate equities annually are expected to have about fifty
billion dollars to invest in all markets this year."6 7
The financial community is eager to use pension funds for corporate
financing, although they clearly recognize the deteriorating health of the stock
market. The article continues:
50
"(A) problem is that corporate securities look increasingly
chancy to lenders and investors. The average corporate
balance sheet is in a precarious state of disrepair, with too
much short-term debt, too little liquidity and deteriorating
interest coverage. The situation stands little chance of
improving in 1982, given the glum profit prospects . . . The
markets will continue to be fickle as they were in 1981 . .
Moreover, companies cannot altogether avoid the haunting
conjecture that the economy could tumble into a full-scale
depression, halting the flow of funds." 68
With increased pension fund investment in corporate securities and this
gloom and doom report, one must wonder if managers are investing pension
funds with the sole interest of getting the best and safest return for
beneficiaries. In light of the past performance of pension fund investments,
workers have reason to worry about the financial management of their funds.
SOCIAL RETURN
Pension fund managers have historically not considered "social return" -
the social and economic consequences of investment on the fund beneficiaries.
It is still the case that fund managers invest pension funds in companies that
trade with repressive and apartheid nations, that are non-unionized, have health
and safety violations and have exported jobs abroad. Managers also ignore
investments which could add social benefits for pension fund members. Social
return may be of no concern to Wall Street investment bankers, but there is an
increased realization on the part of workers that their own money is invested in
ways antithetical to their long-term economic and social interests.
Unfortunately, most workers have no representation or voice in
management of their pension fund and cannot change investment policies, if
they wanted to. Workers do not have the decisionmaking power to influence
investments. Moreover, financial institutions are uninterested in "social return"
issues.
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Jointly trusteed funds and public pension funds are starting to pursue
investment policies which account for added social and economic return as well
as financial yield. The concept of social return is just beginning to be explored,
and is the theme of the second chapter.
SUMMARY
Pension funds began as a gratuity offered by an employer to a worker.
Employers made all decisions regarding the management and benefits of the
pension fund. Laws enacted, such as ERISA insured that employers pay
promised benefits due to workers according to eligibility standards. In most
single-employer pension plans, the employer still controls the investment
policies of the fund. A few bank trust departments, insurance companies and
investment firms handle day-to-day investment management of pension funds.
Bank trust departments and insurance companies have different
investment policies regarding pension fund assets. Trusteed funds are heavily
invested in corporate equities while insured funds emphasize fixed income
investments. Insurance companies have similar financial needs to pension
funds, but have a much higher proportion of mortgage investments. This
difference in mortgage investments between pension fund and insurance
companies reveals an institutional management bias against mortgages, by trust
department portfolio managers, expecially since mortgages have had desirable
financial rates of return. The few pension systems holding mortgage
investments are public funds and jointly trusteed plans.
Financial performance of pension funds has* been poor with annual
investment returns below inflation rates and market indices. These consistently
low rates raise questions about the competence of pension fund investment
managers. One explanation for poor rates of return is that pension funds have
been used by financial institutions to prop up the stock market, to provide
needed equity financing for corporate America, even when there are better
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yields from other investments.
In short, there is an increased realization that workers own over eight
hundred billion dollars in pension fund money, but a few Wall Street bankers
control the investment of that social capital and those investments are often
not in the financial, social and economic interests of pension fund beneficiaries.
The long-term interests of workers can and should be accounted for in the
investment of their money. The next chapter explores the issues of accounting
for workers long-term interests and second, discusses the options and obstacles
in alternative pension fund investments.
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CHAPTER #2
STRATEGIC INVESTING
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Traditional pension fund investment practices, as described in Chapter #1,
have been called into question by many different groups for a variety of
reasons. First, past poor financial performance of pension funds has fueled the
pension fund investment debate at all levels of government, in corporate
boardrooms and in union halls. Second, traditional investing methods are under
scrutiny because they ignore the social and economic impacts of the
investments. For expample, there is national concern over "socially
irresponsible" investments by pension funds incorporations which conduct
business in South Africa and domestic companies with unfair labor practices.
Third, pension funds are under the spotlight because of their enormous
structural power in the economy. Politicians, corporations and unions are
realizing pension fund's potential for supporting certain sectors which need
capital. Just the discussion of changing priorities for investment has caused
legal and political attention. Realization of the economic power of pension
funds, along with poor rates of return, and pressure for socially responsible
investments have all contributed to the search for new investment strategies.
The conscious design of investment policies which consider the social and
economic impact of investments as well as risk and rate of return is often
called investing". In the literature, it is also referred to as divergent investing,
development investing, non-traditional or alternative investing and strategic
investing. I shall use the term strategic investing which refers to a strategy to
explicitly account for additional social or economic goals in the investment
process. Inherent in the definition of strategic investing is that the decision
making process is open to debate on the social and economic consequences of
investments.
This section of the paper focuses on the issues and debate around
strategic pension fund investing. Three categories of strategic investing are
described, including examples of existing programs and those actively
considered. The legal debate around social goals in investment decisions is
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discussed. To date, there has been a lot of talk about strategic investments but
very little chnage in policies. The final section of this chapter will discuss the
obstacles to implementing strategic investing.
Advocates of both strategic and traditional investment policies agree that
the primary purpose of a pension fund is to provide a steady, secure retirement
income. The financial integrity of the retirement system must be the main
concern of the fund's investment policy. The goal of a traditional pension fund
investment policy is receive an optimal rate of return on the portfolio with a
minimum amount of risk, regardless of the social or economic consequences of
an investment on the beneficiaries or the general public. In contrast, the
objective of strategic investing is to target investments to create social
benefits in addition to a secure retirement income. These benefits from
targetted investments could include: 1
* meeting housing needs of beneficiaries of the public
* increasing employment opportunities
* making available additional services to plan participants
* supporting alternative energy development
* supporting goals of worker rights and safety
* providing capital to small businesses
Of course, there is tremendous debate among those who support the
concept of strategic investing as to how to account for social benefits in the
investment decision making process. Unlike risk and rate of return, there are
no econometric models to measure social benefits or non-financial criteria.
Some people argue that non-financial criteria should only enter into the
decision making process when investments have equal return and risk. When
everything else is equal, then social impacts should be considered. Others
believe that strategic investing means that social and economic obectives
should be accounted for in all investments whether they are equal or not. In
between these two viewpoints, there are supporters of the view that a certain
percent of
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Ithe fund should be devoted to targetted investments, which explicitly consider
social costs or benefits.
The best way to understand how social benefits can be incorporated into
pension fund investments is to look at the few existing examples of strategic
investing. Three categories of strategic investing can be identified from the
literature.2
* strategies that are designed to provide direct benefits to pension fund
members
* strategies designed to expand capital placement in particular sectors
* strategies designed to reward or punish particular forms of behavior
STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE DIRECT SOCIAL BENEFITS TO PENSION
FUND MEMBERS
This category includes those investments which encourage unionization,
job creation, localized economic development and housing for pension fund
participants. The best example of strategic investments designed to promote
unionization and job creation in the beneficiaries interest involve the AFL-CIO
Building Trades mortgage investment programs which specify unionized
construction labor on all its mortgages. This example will be discussed in detail
in the next chapter. New York City's public pension fund's purchase of New
York City bonds during the 1975 fiscal crisis is an example of a strategic
investment providing direct benefits and potential costs to participants.
Without the bond purchases, it was quite likely that many city pension fund
members would lose their jobs entirely, thus, the investment offered direct
economic benefit to most city employees.
In 1979, UAW and Chrysler reached an agreement regarding pension fund
investments which potentially can provide direct social benefits to pension fund
members. Overall, the agreement gave the union more voice in the pension
fund administration. A key part of the agreement is that up to ten percent
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4(10%) of new money in the Chrysler employer pension fund may be invested in
loans or bonds to non-profit nursing homes, nursery schools, health maintenance
organizations, hospitals or similar non-profit institutions in communities where
there are large concentrations of UAW members. This money can also be
invested in residential mortgages in communities where there are substantial
numbers of UAW workers. 3
The most common method of pension fund investing to provide additional
direct benefits to participants is through residential mortgage loans for
members. Two public pension plans, Hawaii's and Connecticut's, have created
programs to invest in home loans for their member.s
Hawaii Employment Retirement System (ERS) has about thirty percent
(30%) of its pension fund invested in home loans for its members and pensioners.
The mortgage investments, called the Member Home Loan Program, offer
mortgage loans up to eighty percent (80%) of price. The Program started
twenty years ago to help meet the housing needs of the pension system
members and reduce the housing shortage in the state. Through this program,
below market interest rate mortgages are made available to system members.
ERS works with sixteen local lending institutions to administer the mortgages
to the fund members.
The interest rate on the mortgages are about one percent to one point
five percent (1% - 1.5%) below the conventional rate in Hawaii. Stanley Siu, the
head of the Program discussed the rate of return on the mortgages compared to
stocks and bonds:
"As far as equities are concerned, I think the mortgage loan
portfolio is still ahead because of the stock market being the
way it is. In the bond area, it has been very comparable to the
kinds of rate of return that we have ... Recently, the coupon,
the interest rate has gone up on bonds, but we have gone up
accordingly in our interest rates." 4
62
The mortgage investments are also very secure; there has not been a
mortgage defualt in the history of the program. The Program provides
quantifiable social benefits. Over thirty percent (30%) of the pension fund
members have taken advantage of the home loan program. There has been
some criticism that those who benefitted from the Program are the upper-
income, white collar workers in the ERS. "This (criticism) has caused the Board
concern, so ten million dollars ($10,000,000) has been invested in the Hawaii
Housing Authority to provide housing for low-income public employees." 5 The
Program offers direct benefits to members in addition to a guaranteed pension,
as well as providing needed capital in Hawaii's economy. One report on the
Program states: "Since the state is generally categorized as a capital-short
state, there is some support for the notion that the fund is actually providing
capital that otherwise would not be available." 6
Another state pension fund mortgage investment program began in
Connecticut this past summer. Connecticut's state employee pension fund
offered forty million dollars ($40,000,000) in mortgage money through a
program called "Yankee Mac". In June, 1981, the mortgage money was offered
on a first-come-first-serve basis with an interest rate of 13.5% (the rate of an
Aaa corporate bond at the time). The conventional mortgage interest rate was
17.25%. The mortgages were for single family homes and required ten percent
(10%) down payment. Half of the mortgages were allocated to state employees
and teachers while the other half was for the general public. Within eight hours
after the mortgage money was offered, seven hundred fourteen homebuyers
received loans and the forty million dollars was gone. 7 The social benefits of the
Yankee Mac program are similar to the Hawaii program, except some of the
benefits go directly to taxpayers, also. Connecticut is planning to offer four
hundred million dollars ($400,000,000) more in mortgage money in the future.
Other states, such as New Hampshire and California have proposed home
investment programs similar to those in Connecticut and Hawaii. Certain uions
such as the American Pilots Association have also proposed pension fund
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investments in home loans to union members. With the management of most
pension funds in companies hands, there is little incentive to make investments
which have direct social benefits for fund members. The expamples cited in
which strategic investments have been designed to directly benefit fund
participants, are either with public funds with employee representation on the
retirement board or private plans that have a labor union representative
involved in the management of the fund. The connection between employee
participation in investment policy and strategic investments is apparent in the
other two categories, also.
STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO EXPAND CAPITAL PLACEMENT IN PARTICULAR SECTORS
The second category encompasses those strategies designed to increase
the capital flow in a targetted area or in a particular sector. The investment
policy would have certain economic objectives such as increasing housing stock
generally or for a target population, stimulating economic growth, inducing
business to move or increasing employment. The goal of this investment
strategy is to provide capital that otherwise would not be available, without
making financial concessions to the pension fund.
To accomplish the goal of this strategy, investments must be taretted to
fill a capital gap rather than displace other capital. The investments,
expecially in the case of public funds, should not just replace potential private
investments. The best example of displacement is public pension fund
purchases of government guaranteed mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities, such as GNMA's, ostensibly to increase the amount of housing in
their state. Many state pension funds including California, Alabama, Oregon,
Pennsylvania and New York have bought GNMA's targetted to their state,
giving the impression that these investments will help stimulate the local
housing market. Because GNMA securities are fully guaranteed, have a
competitive return and are easy to administer, thus, highly marketable, they
are sound investments for all buyers. Carol O'Cleireacain captured the
displacement problem of GNMA's in an article
64
in Working Papers Magazine. In discussing New York City's increased
investments in GNMA securities, the author writes:
"The federal guarantees carried by Ginnie Maes mean no risk
and the return is competitive with Treasury securities. The
net increase in available mortgage money to New York City,
however, is negligible. Such schemes are proliferating among
public employee pension funds around the country and are
promoted as "social" investing. But, given the effeciency of
the market, this generally means that the local public
employee pension fund money is simply displacing other money
ather than expanding the total amount of money available for
mortgages." 9
Pension fund investments in GNMA's and other government guaranteed
loans do nothing to fill capital gaps, but they do deflect political pressure to
increase "social investing". One article in Pensions and Investments advocated
government mortgage security investments calling them "social investing
without tears" and argued that " ... there is no shortage of market instruments
today which give the appearance at least of being more directly socially
beneficial and which offer market returns." 10
Political pressure for housing investments by pension funds has typically
come from liberals, but recently arch-conservatives, like Orin Hatch and
President Reagan lobbied for increasing mortgage investments by retirement
funds. At the behest of the National Association of Homebuilders, Senator
Hatch has introduced a bill in Congress which amends ERISA to ease the way
for private pension funds to make more mortgage loans. The bill would allow
private pension fund investment in mortgages at below market rates. It says
that pension funds may invest in mortgages when the yield on those mortgages
equals the average yield on the fund's investment over the past ten years or
when it equals the average yield over any three consecutive years in the past
ten years. The yield referred to is the yield on the whole portfolio, both stocks
and bonds.1 ]As we saw from the last chapter, the average yield on pension fund
portfolios over the last ten years and three year periods between the ten years
has been extremely low. It is Reagan, Hatch and other conservatives who are
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advocating that pension funds make financial concessions in their investments.
There is good reason for President Reagan to support Hatch's bill - - after
slashing all government housing finance programs, Reagan is feeling pressure to
do something to stimulate the slumping housing industry. Private pension funds
are the perfect captive pool of money and no one will know if they finance
below market rate mortgages. Reagan is lobbying for the Hatch bill and
recently had a meeting with the top fifty corporate pension fund sponsors to
urge them to invest more money in home mortgages.1 2 This type of
encouragement could help diversify portfolios and even increase total return,
but, if the mortgages are way below market-rate (which Hatch's bill
encourages), workers retirement money may be threatened, without their
consent. Pensions and Investment Age denounced Hatch's bill saying:
"The lower cost mortgages are thus subsidizing the housing
industry through an invisible tax on the plan participants and
consumers. Since they have no say as to whether these
investments should be made, it is taxation without
representation; . . . If it is appropriate to direct special
attention to subsidizing the housing industry it should be done
openly through government tax relief or appropriations, not
"under the table." 1 3
National Association of Homebuilders is also lobbying states pension funds
to increase mortgage investments. In New Jersey, for example, the New Jersey
Homebuilders Association is lobbying for a bill to mandate the public employee
pension plan to invest ten percent (10%) of the fund in mortgages that are two
percent (2%) below market rate. 1 4 They call the program, "Jersey Shares".
Unlike the programs in Connecticut or Hawaii, "Jersey Shares" would finance
houses that most public employees could not even afford. The houses average
ninety thousand dollars ($90,000) and need at least a median income of forty
thousand dollars ($40,000) to finance the home. None of the houses are rental.
The housing benefits are not going to most public employees who take the risk
of the financial concessions, (the 2% discount).
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There are ways for pension fund to strategically invest in housing to fill
capital gaps without threatening return. For example, Oregon has started a
targetted pass-through mortgage-backed security program, whereby, the state
pension fund buys shares in a conventionally financed mortgage pool put
together by a lending institution. 15The mortgages are originated by Oregon
lenders who also hold the insurance policy on the mortgages. The principal
balance of each mortgage loan is at laest twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) and
cannot exceed seventy five thousand ($75,000). At least ninety percent (90%)
of the loans must be for moderate-income single family detached houses with
no more than ten percent (10%) of the mortgages for condominiums.
In 1978, ninety percent (90%) of the loans were less than sixty thousand
dollars ($60,000) and one hundred thirty million dollars ($130,000,000) was
invested in this residential mortgage program. 16 It is difficult to measure
whether these mortgage investments would have been made without the public
pension fund investment. But, because these mortgages are targetted
geographically and by income level, pension fund investments have a good
chance of increasing the amount of moderate income houseing in Oregon, by at
least a little bit, while still maintaining a competitive rate of return for its
beneficiaries. A private pension fund could conceivably create a similar
program which invests in targetted conventional mortgage-back securities.
New York City Council member, Ruth Messinger, has proposed a strategic
housing investment plan financed by city pension funds.171his proposal suggests
that the New York City Employment Retirement System (NYCERS) invest in
moderate rehabilitation loans for existing housing stock. The moderate
rehabilition loans would be originated and pooled by the Community
Preservation Corporation, a private, non-profit consortium of local savings and
commercial banks which already have financed moderate housing rehabilitaiton
projects. The pension's rehabilition loan investments would be insured by
certain state agencies. This program takes advantage of existing institutions to
facilitate strategic investing. The strategy for NYCERS housing investments is
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*one of the most targetted pension fund housing programs proposed. It is
designed to maintain the security of the fund investment and to fill a needed
capital gap.
Two other housing investment strategies for pension funds are suggested
in a new book titled, Pension Funds and Economic Renewal, by Lawrence
LitvakJ8 The first suggestion is pension fund purchases of graduated payment
plan mortgages which potentially have benefits for both borrower and investor.
The second proposal involves public pension fund investment in limited equity
housing cooperatives. Both proposals are geared toward contributing to the
shelter needs of moderate income households and are intricately designed to
provide a competitive rate of return to the pension fund.
Besides housing finance, some strategic investments have been designed
to increase capital flow to small businesses. The single largest problem for
small businesses is access to capital. Pension funds have "patient money" -
money that can be invested for a long time period, which is exactly what small
businesses need. Small businesses especially need equity financing in exchange
for a portion of the firm's future income. Typically, pension funds invest in
firms that have a market value of over one hundred million dollars
($100,000,000) and often when they buy or sell stocks, it is in blocks of twenty
five million dollars ($25,000,000) or more. The argument is that pension funds
should invest more in small or medium-size businesses and venture capital
firms, because of their job-generating potential. The research by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor, David Birch, found that small
firms (those with twenty employees or less) were responsible for sixty six
percent (66%) of all new jobs generated in the United States.93irch's results are
often cited to support the argument that investments in small businesses may
increase employment opportunities.
A few pension funds have invested in small businesses through venture
capital partnerships, Small Business Investment Corporations (SBIC's), private
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debt placement and by purchasing Small Business Administration (SBA)
guaranteed loans. The major problem for pension fund investment in small
businesses is the costs of research, packaging and administering these
investments. Despite high transaction costs, pension funds have recently
invested a small percent of their money in venture capital partnerships, because
of the high returns. The median annualized cummulative return between 1960
and 1980 for venture capital partnership was twenty seven point 1 percent
(27. 1%). 20
In 1980, pension funds supplied twenty nine percent (29%) of new capital
to venture partnerships. Major corporate pension funds such as General
Electirc, Hughs Aircraft, Union Oil, Chrysler, Continental Group, Alcoa and
Grumman Corporation, have invested a small percent of their portfolios in
venture capital limited partnerships. 1 The Ohio State Teachers Fund has point
two percent (.2%) of the fund (total fund has four billion dollars in assets) in
venture capital partnerships. The spokesperson for the fund is quoted as saying:
"Our ventue capital investments have turned around and have provided
cummulative returns substantially in excess of any other investments we've
seen in a long time"22 California has a bill in legislature to allow one percent
(1%) of the state pension fund portfolio to be invested in firms with less than
one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) in assets. If passed, there would be
three hundred million- dollars ($300,000,000) to invest in small or mdeium-sized
businesses and potentially could be targetted to growing industries and job-
generating businesses.
A few pension funds have invested in SBIC's which are venture capital
partnerships that have access to federal subsidies and financing through loans,
grants and leveraging arrangements. SBIC's must invest only in businesses
which meet SBA eligibility requirements. One example of a pension fund
capitalized SBIC is the Energy Capital Corporation formed with contributions
from the pension funds of Allegheny Ludlom, Air Canada and American General
Insurance Company. 23
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Public pension funds, such as those in Kansas and Milwaukee, have also
purchased SBA guaranteed loans with the stated intent of increasing capital to
small businesses. Like GNMA's these SBA loans usually displace private
investors, because the securities are in high demand and marketable, thus, doing
little to increase economic development in an area. The California Public
Investment Task Force and Lawrence Litvak, in his new book, have proposed
new investment vehicles which mitigate the risk that is involved in small
business investment, either through state or private insurance or through the
pooling of funds. If a small percent of a pension fund is devoted to small
business investment, it could take on a slightly higher risk in compensation for a
petentially higher return and the possibility of creating new job opportunities.
Some pension funds have also designed strategies which geographically
target areas presumed to need capital. Many state and city pension funds have
adopted in-state or in-city preferences for their investments, in the hope of
generating more income for their locality. The potential multiplier effects of
in-city investments by a pension fund are used to justify these geographical
mandates. These often-cited multiplier effects should be taken with a grain of
salt. First, multipliers are difficult to measure because of leakage, the income
flowing into other localities or states, and usually are overestimated. Second,
an increase in one area's multiplier usually means a decrease in other area's
multipliers. Michael Kieschnick, author of a report titled, "Investing in the
Public Interest, The Case of Public Pension Funds" writes:
"These multiplier effects are generally constant-sum games ..
. . There is not a magic power to create new income through
the multiplier unless there is also an increase in effeciency
(e.g. the more rapid development of small businesses) or unless
residents choice about savings and consumption change. In
addition giving in-state investments a preference is somewhat
like using tax breaks. The first state which favors in-state
investments will probably not provoke a response from pension
funds of other states, but eventually, if the first state is
successful, all states will adopt in-state preferences . . . The
in-state preference should therefore be used carefully and
should come into play when competing investments are very
close by standard financial criteria."?2 4
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Usually, these geographic mandates are not targetted will enough to fill
capital gaps, but are used for political purposes to foster local pride. Pension
fund investments strategies, in this second category, which are geared toward
increasing capital flow to housing, small businesses or to a geographic aea, need
to be carefully designed so they do not just displace other money and so they
don't make financial concessions with workers money. If investment vehicles
are designed well, pension funds can fill actual capital gaps.
STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO REWARD OR PUNISH PARTICULAR FORMS OF BEHAVIOR
This third category refers to strategies designed to incorporate the
economic interests or philosophical preferences of pension plan members in the
funds investments. The method to acomplish this strategy is to invest in
securities of corporations which are not oppossed to the pension fund members'
philosophical or economic interests. For example, some pension funds have
made attempts to avoid investments in corporations that deal with countries
that follow discriminatory or repressive policies, such as South Africa. Other
pension funds have emphasized divesting from or avoiding future investments in
corporations which have unfair labor practices or violate work safety and health
requirements.. The objective of these strategic investment activities is to
further human rights and advance the goals of workers rights.
In the 1970's, United States corporate investment in South Africa became
a passionate issue, especially in universities. Public and private pension funds
invest huge amounts of money in the same corporations which tacitly support
this segregationist regime. Students in major U.S. universities campaigned for
divesting from those companies that do business with South Africa. University
of California, Stanford, Harvard and Yale have all set up regular committees to
advise pension fund trustees on the "social responsibility" issues around their
investments. The University of Wisconsin, University of Massachusetts, Smith
College and Hampshire College have already divested themselves of some South
Africa related holdings. 2 5 The Service Employees International Union,
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Longshoremen and Warehousers Union, United Auto Workers and the National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees have called for their pension fund
trustees to divest holdings in companies which invest in South Africa. 26
Unfortunately, it is difficult for any pension fund to actually divest
themselves of South Africa related holdings, because the vast majority of the
top five hundred corporations do business with South Africa. It is debatable
whether pension funds would sacrifice yield on their portfolio if they did divest
from South Africa related holdings, but, there certainly would be high
transaction costs to switch out of the top five hundred corporate securities.
Although, it has been difficult to implement a divestment from South
Africa policy, the public spotlight on American corporate investments in South
Africa gave credibility to the notion of "socially responsible" investing. Some
investment firms, such as Drexel Bernam Lambert, Merrill Lynch, Martin Segal
Company, Dreyfus Fund, and Shearson Loeb Rhodes, have set up special
"socially responsible" accounts which avoid investing in corporations which do
business with repressive regimes. In its agreement with Chrysler, UAW may
submit to the pension fund trustees annually a list of up to five companies that
conduct business in South Africa and recommend that the trustees refrain from
investing in the securities of those corporations. The Investor Responsibility
Research Center, The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and
Council on Economic Priorities and other groups monitor American business,
providing information to churches, colleges, banks, investment firms, pension
funds and individuals on the social implications of investment strategies. 2 7The
South African issue exposed the connection between an investment and its
social and economic implications. John Harrington, a representative of Service
Employees International Union in a roundtable discussion on socially responsible
investments stated:"
"Now it may be, as someone had pointed out earlier, and on
occassion rvepointed out, that we can make more immediate
dollars off slave labor. Perhaps that's so. and I think we ought
72
Af
to be very clear and say we can make more money for our
retirees in South Africa off slave labor. That maximizes our
total financial and economic return. and I think we ought to
be honest and do it.n 28
The South Africa issue also made public and private unions question their
other pension fund investments. Major unions found that they have large
investments in companies which have fought all forms of organized labor in
their firms, such as Halliburton, Inc. and Texas Instruments. Recently, the
AFL-CIO Building Trades and Construction Union discovered that their pension
fund money managed by the Prudential Life Insurance Company, financed the
National Right to Work Life building in Springfield, Virginia which was built by
non-unionized construction labor. This made a clear, tangible connection
between the union's pension funds investments and the impact those
investments can have on their members own economic well-being. They are
financing their own competition. Prudential Insurance has since set up separate
accounts for union pension funds to support mortgage investments that stipulate
unionized construction labor. Similarly, Aetna Insurance and a few banks have
set up separate "socially responsible" accounts for pension funds. 29
In a recent pension fund report, the AFL-CIO urged their local unions to
invest "in firms that have good labor relations records and that support their
employees exercise of organizational rights under the Federal labor laws in
order to encourage positive labor relations, employer compliance with the labor
laws and industrial stability: and exclude from union pension plan investment
portfolios companies whose policies are hostile to worker's rights.n30
One corporation, Corporate Data Exchange, consciously tried to avoid
investing their pension fund asset in non-unionized firms, OSHA and EEOC
violators and major investors in South Africa. There has been a lot of
controversy around CDE's efforts because of the difficulty in drawing a line
between socially responsible and socially irresponsible companies and some
firms have complained of blacklisting. For CDE, it has been hard to find
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companies which do not violate some aspect of the social repsonsibility criteria.3 1
CDE's investment program is an experiment in explicitly looking at the social
implications of corporate investments instead of ignoring them.
The best example of a successfully implemented strategic investment
policy involves J.P. Stevens Corporation and the Amalgamated Clothing Textile
Workers Union (ACTWU). J.P. Stevens has long ben the "number one labor law
violator" in the country. 3 2 Since 1929, Stevens has fought unionization in its
textile mills. The National Labor Relations Board has charged Stevens with
numerous labor law violations including illegally interfering in elections,
coercing workers and firing prounion sympathizers. The ACTWU had been
unsuccessful in its organizing drives despite strikes and a five-year worldwide
consumer boycott of Stevens products.
In 1979, ACTWU took a different tactic and used an investment strategy
aimed at isolating Stevens from the financial community. The targets of the
ACTWU campaign were Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Avon Products, New
York Life Insurance, Goldman Sachs & Company, The Sperry Corporation and
Metropolitan Life, all of which had interlocking directorates with J.P. Stevens. 3 3
First, Manufacturers Hanover Trust was threatened with a withdrawl of
hundreds of millions of dollars in pension fund accounts; the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union withdrew $6.4 million from its account, the IAM
threatened to withdraw $160 million and other unions threatened to withdraw
their money if Manufacturers Hanover Trust did not sever their ties with
Stevens34 Second, the industrial companies were threatened with a freeze-out
on pension fund investments. Third, the ACTWU ran union-backed candidates
for director seats on Metropolitan Life and New York Life. Just before the
election both insurance companies cut their ties with Stevens. The final blow
was when Manufacturers Hanover Trust Director, James Finley, who also was
Chairman of J.P. Stevens, resigned from the bank's Board. The investment
punishment stategy worked well. In October, 1980, ACTWU won union contracts
at Stevens huge textile complex in North Carolina and at three other plants. In
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the union contract there was a clause pledging the union to "refrain from future
efforts to force resignations from the Stevens Board or to upset its financial or
credit relationships with other companies." 3 @his clause illustrated the success
of the ACTWU strategy.
In 1979, the Retail Clerks Union threatened to withdraw two billion dollars
from Seattle First National Bank unless the bank negotiated a contract with the
Union and the bank has lost over five hundred million from other union
accounts, due to its labor practices.6 Punishing union busters by withdrawing
money may prove to be a better organizing strategy than strikes or boycotts. It
is precisely these strategies of punishing or rewarding firms with pension fund
money according to "social criteria" that creates legal questions. Although,
there are a variety of legal issues involved in alternative pension fund investing,
the case law and legislation related to this subject does not prohibit strategic
investing. Contrary to what many people think, the law is not the major
obstacle to implementing alternative investment policies. Nevertheless, the
legal debate is important to understanding the issues and constraints
surrounding all three types of strategic investing.
LEGAL DEBATE
Strategic investing, as we have seen from the above discussion, can
involve a variety of issues - job creation, housing, unioin campaigns, labor
practices, racism - with different methods for achieving those objectives such
as divestiture, packaging of mortgages, exclusionary policies, inclusionary rules
and amendments to state statutes.7 The legal debate concerns how and when
trustees should consider the multitude of issues and methods mentioned above.
The intricacies of the pension fund legal debate are well beyond the scope of
this paper, but breifly, I will mention the issues and cases around two major
questions regarding strategic investments. First, what types of strategic
investments are likely to be legal? Second, when are there legal requirements
to consider the social impact of a pension fund investment on the beneficiaries
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of the fund? There are still unresolved legal issues in this new field of strategic
investing, but so far, the laws do not prohibit the consideration of social
benefits when making pension fund investments.
The basic tenets of all trust law are that a fiduciary must be loyal to
beneficiaries and invest the trust with reasonable care. These general
guidelines have most recently been codified in ERISA. Under ERISA (which
only applies to private pension funds) a fiduciary must make all investments 1)
solely in the interest of the beneficiary (no self dealing) 2) for the exclusive
purpose of paying benefits and 3) with prudence. There are ambiguities around
all three issues, but espcially around what is prudent.
The common law prudence rule was generated in 1830 from the Harvard
College v. Amory case. Harvard College sued their trustee, Francis Amory, for
mismanaging their trust and losing money, because he invested in
manufacturing and insurance company stocks. Harvard said Amory had
"exposed the capital to great loss" by not investing in government securities, or
other conservative, holdings. The Court sided with Amory saying that thiere is
risk in all investments and "no sharp distinction between safe and unsafe
investments". 38
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise sound discretion. He is
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculations, but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
probable income as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested."39
The Harvard College v. Amory case gave more latitude around prudence
than previously existed. Since this case, the Court interpretation has become
rigid and has often implied that a fiduciary is prudent as long as he or she
follows what other fiduciaries are doing. As Randy Barber says: "As long as
you can prove that you are doing what the rest of the pack is doing, you are
prudent." 40 (This "herd instinct" has helped justify past poor financial
performance of pension funds.)
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The most recent legal case concerning the prudence issue in questionable
investments was Withers v. Teachers Retirement Systems of the City of New
York. Beneficaries of a New York City pension fund challenged the trustees of
their fund for making investments in New York City securities in 1975 when the
City was in a severe financial crisis. The court held that the Comptroller, who
was the trustee of the fund, 1) did not act in self interest by investing in New
York City bonds, 2) the trustees decision to buy even "highly speculative" bonds
in large amounts over two years apart of a plan to save the employer "was a
prudent one in view of the fact tht the City was a major contributor to the
pension fund and ultimate guarantor of the benefits", and 3) enough care was
taken in considering and making the investment.4
The Withers case, first, demonstrates that non-traditional considerations
can be appropriate in pension fund investments. Second, the case underscores
the idea that the process of decision making is central in deciding whether an
investment is prudent or not. The discussion, motives and considerations of the
potential investment before it is made is evaluated in any questions about
prudence. In the Grumman Corporation case cited earlier the trustee's stock
purchases were called imprudent, in part becasue there was only a half hour of
discussion before investing and the trustees motives were questioned. A
prudent investment does not have to have a maximum rate or return, but it does
have to be undertaken with "reasonable case" and no evidence of "self dealing".
The case law has made a distinction between "self dealing" and the
consideration of non-financial criteria. Blankenship v. Boyle (1971) involved
beneficiaries suing United Mine Workers pension fund trustees for
mismanagement. The fund invested in coal company stocks and utilities which
benefitted union members. However, in this case there was evidence of
conflicts of interest with union officilas and pension fund trustees. The fund
had huge losses because trustees had put the money in non-interest bearing
accounts. By themselves the coal and utility stocks may not have been
imprudent, but the conflicts of interest made it clear that the fund was not
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being administered "solely in the interest" of the beneficiaries. The Court
stated: "In short, the Fund proceeded without any clear understanding of the
trustees exclusive duty to beneficiaries, and its affairs were so loosely
controlled that abuses, mistakes and inattention to detail occurred."42 1he key
difference between Withers and Blankenship is the "self dealing" in the later
case.
The three major cases, cited here have given loose boundaries and
definitions to prudent investing. The leglities of current strategic investments
are still being defined. Ian Lanoff, the administrator of pension programs in the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has issued statements on how DOL believes
non-financial criteria should enter into investment decision making. The
current rule of thumb is that if two investments have approximately equal
expected rates of return and risk, then, the social and economic impact of the
investment can be considered. Under ERISA, fiduciaries must diversify plan
investments to minimize risk, and thus, should broaden the range of posible
investments. Ian Lanoff writes: "If fiduciaries can assure that a broader range
of investment vehicles will be examined, they can more likely assure that they
will be presented with choices among economically equal but socially unequal
investments." 43
The argument that portfolios must be diversified can help and hurt
supporters of strategic investing. Lanoff has taken a stand against a broad
exclusionary investment policy, such as not investing in companies which do
business in South Africa. He writes:
"The argument is made that there are so many investment
choices, the exclusion from consideration of a number or class
of investments does not violate ERISA standards. But as a
-practical matter this "so many fish in the sea" argument is
only persuasive when you know you haven't eliminated the big
fish. Exclusion of a significant segment of the investment
opportunity universe, without consideration of investment
merit would generally not be prudent." 44
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Lanoff discourages exclusionary policies and supports inclusionary rules,
such as asking a trustee to include more mortgages in a plan portfolio.
As more questionable cases arise, the Department of Labor administrators
define the boundaries of strategic investing. DOL and many in the legal
community recognize the use of non-financial criteria in investment decision
making. The major legal text on trust law, Scotts Law of Trusts acknowledged
strategic investing in its recent edition:
"Trustees in deciding whether to invest in or retain the
securities of a corporation may properly consider the social
performance of the corporation. They may decline to invest in
or to retain the securities of coporations whose activities or
some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally
accepted principles. They may consider such matters as
pollution, race discrimination, fair employment and consumer
responsiblity. . . . Of course, they may well believe that a
corporation which has a proper sense of social obligation is
more likely to be successful in the long run than those which
are bent on obtaining the maximum amount of profits. But,
even if this were not so, the investor through a trustee of
funds for others is entitled to consider the wefare of the
community and refrain from agowing the use of funds* in a
manner detrimental to others."
The second question extends beyond whether a trustee may consider non-
financial creiteria, and asks whether a fiduciary legally must consider the social
and economic impact of the investment on the beneficiaries. There are two
lines of reasoning to support the idea that trustees have a fiduciary
responsibility to consider social impacts.
First, the prudent person principle states that trustees must make
investment decisions as if a "prudent man" were investing his own money. No
"prudent man" would invest in a company that was harmful to his own economic
interests. For example, it is doubtful a "prudent man" would invest in his own
competitor. Karen Ferguson, the Director of the Employee Benefits Research
Institute (EBRI) presents this argument in a roundtable discussion on the
legalities of strategic investing: "Since no reasonable prudent man would be so
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shortsighted as to invest his money to undercut his own interest, "social
considerations" would automatically be factored into the investment process." 46
Secondly, it is argued that it is incumbent upon a trustee to consider
social impacts of investments because these impacts may affect the long-term
financial rate of return. A company which has continually had poor labor
relations could have a secure yield now, but in the long run may be prone to
strikes or boycotts, which could jeopardize the financial rate of return.
Comapnies which violate OSHA, EPA or EEO regulations may not have
internalized their costs adequately and could also be poor economic investments
in their long run.k'rustees already do implicitly account for economic impacts
of different investments. For example, if a company has offices in Iran or
another anti-American country, there are economic and social consequences
from the investment which may make it a poor choice from a long-term
financial perspective. In order to make an informed investment, social impacts
should be accounted for.
Both these arguments suggest that a secure pension fund demands that
trustees consider the social implications of their investments. At a conference
on this subject, Karen Ferguson stated:
"Retirement income security of participants can only be
protected if certain social considerations are taken into
account and that the fiduciary provisions of ERISA make sense
only if they are read to require fiduciaries to take these social
considerations into account." 48
There has yet to be a legal case in which beneficiaries claimed their
trustees failed to consider the social impacts of investments. Also, there has
been "no case in which legal sanctions were imposed upon trustees, a trust
manager or a trust for giving non-self-serving weight to the social or non-
economic impact of an investment even when investment promising a high
return were available."4 bne problem with clarifying what is legal in this field,
is that most strategic investing cases involve state or local pension funds, not
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covered by federal statutes. There have been too few non-traditional
investment cases in the private sector to test the range of legal issues in
strategic investing. Ironically, the most innovative investment programs have
come from public pension funds, despite that fact that state statutes are more
rigid than ERISA. If anything, purely legal barriers to strategic investing should
be stronger in the public sector. Legal obstacles are not the reason for lack of
strategic investing in the private sector for two resons: First, many public
funds have overcome even more rigid legal barriers than private sector funds
encounter and second, legal rulings thus far, have been flexible enough to at
least try different forms of strategic investing. There are, however, many
other real constraints which prevent implementing strategic investing of
pension funds.
OBSTACLES TO STRATEGIC INVESTING
With so few examples of strategic investment, it is clear that there are
practical, institutional and ideological constraints to achieving a non-traditional
pension fund investment policy. This section identifies seven major obstacles to
implementing a process for strategic investing: 1) employer control, 2)
institutional management, 3) lack of information, 4) information costs, 5)
evaluation problems, 6) consensus problems, and 7) conventional wisdom.
EMPLOYER CONTROL
The first and foremost obstacle is discussed throughout this paper - -
employees have virtually no control over the investment of their pension fund
assets. There is no incentive on the part of employer trustees to look at the
social or economic impacts of their investment policies on the owners of the
fund. Infact, there may be incentives for management to purposely invest
against the interests of workers, because management and labor interests are
traditional quite different. As noted earlier, the few examples of strategic
investing occur either in the public sector or with jointly-trusteed funds, in
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which there are employee trustees. In all the cases mentioned, there is
employee input in the management of the fund. It is evident that employee
trustees have more incentive to make sure investments coinicide with workers
long-term economic interests. Management will fight to maintain control over
pension fund investment and to insure that those assets are heavily inveted in
corporate stocks and bonds. Employees must negotiate for more control over
the management of their funds, if they want to be assured that their assets are
being invested in their economic, social and financial interests.
INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT
Even when emplolyees have some control over their pension fund, they
usually contract out investment responsibility to institutional money managers.
Professional money managers, the second obstacle, also have no incentive or
inclination to look at non-financial consequences of investments. Bank trustees
and other investment professionals are typically unfamiliar with government
mortgage programs, for example, or the needs of their clients. Professional
pension fund managers are trained and accustomed to investing only in the top
five hundred corporate stocks and bonds; it is very difficult to retrain these
managers to look at mortgage or medium-sized business investments.
LACK OF INFORMATION
Institutional money managers often blame their absence of interest in
strategic investing on the third obstacle, lack of information on the non-
financial aspects of investments. For example, there is practically no data on
the impact of targetted mortgage investments or small to medium-size business
investments. There is very little access to information to compare the social
responsibility of different corporations. It is difficult to get current
information on corporation employee practices. There is also a lack of
information on pension fund holdings in the Federal mortgage market
(i.e./GNMA's, FNMA's). The Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds lumps all federal
mortgage programs under a category called "federal agency securities", thus,
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making it hard to discern how many mortgage securities pension funds actually
hold.
Besides insufficient information on mortgages, small business investment
opportunities, impacts of targetted investments and corporation practices,
there is a lack of accessible information on how particular pension fund
investments are made. Most employees have no idea where their pension money
is invested. ERISA mandates companies to file forms with Department of
Labor on the management and investments of the pension fund, but most
employees are not aware that they have full access to those forms. Although
the information is available, it is difficult to even find out how your pension
fund money is used.
INFORMATION COSTS
Even when needed information is available, there is the fourth obstacle of
high costs in retrieving the infromation. One reason investment managers place
pension money in top corporate stocks and bonds is that it is the cheapest form
of investment transaction for the institution. Mortgage and small business
investments traditionally are associated with higher transaction and
information costs, although GNMA'a, FNMA's and SBA loans have no higher
costs than stocks and bonds. For targetted mortgage investments, trustees may
need to hire mortgage bankers to get access to information, thus, increasing
costs. Investment institutions, such as banks, don't want to spend more money
to receive more investment information, even if it means a higher expected
return, because they can not always pass the costs on to clients. It is also
expensive to find information on corporate business practices. The Council on
Economic Priorities performs social performance audits of major corporations,
but at substantial cost. Like any new field, information costs in strategic
investing are higher than doing business as usual.
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EVALUATION PROBLEMS
The fifth obstacle concerns the evaluation of non-financial criteria in
investments. Trustees are unwilling to try to look at non-financial criteria,
first because they do not know how to prioritize the multitude of strategic
goals and second, because they do not know how to evaluate the performance of
the fund. There is no systematic order for evaluating one company investment
against another when there are a variety of social goals involved in the
investment process. For example, one company may be unionized but invests in
South Africa, while another company does not do busines in South Africa, but
pollutes nearby rivers with toxic wastes. Trustees say they do not want to
make "social judegements". In a democratic investment process with employees
represented, these social judgements would be explicitly discussed and different
funds will find different ways to account and prioritize non-financial criteria
for investments.
The second evaluation problem concerns the measurement of performance
of a fund when social criteria is involved. The financial rate of return is the
best indicator of the performance of a pension fund, even in a strategically
invested fund. Well-designed strategic investment programs do not sacrifice
rate of return and potentially will have higher yields than the past performance
of pension funds. Nevertheless, there is no numeric method for accounting in
the yield the beneifts of increased union jobs or increased shelter to
participants. Trustees often view non-traditional investment policies as too
difficult to implement, because strategic investment goals are hard to measure
and are not conducive to precise modelling.
CONCENSUS PROBLEMS
Some of the evaluation difficulties are caused by obstacle six, consensus
problems. There are obviously differences about social and economic goals
among employees which prevent consensus on investment priorities. New
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workers, older workers and retirees may all have different priorities for their
pension fund investments. For example, new workers may want to invest part
of their fund in low interest mortgages for themselves, while retirees may see
this investment as a threat to their retirement income. Different investments
have different impacts on groups of employees, often preventing consensus on
strategic investment policy.
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The seventh obstacle is what I call conventional wisdom. These are
prevailing attitudes and ideologies which constrain the implementation of
strategic investing. First, for example, pension funds are only thought of by the
public as a retirement income and not as an enormous pool of capital. For sure,
the primary purpose of a pension fund is income for retirement security.
However, strategic investing will only be implemented when people understand
that pension funds are also the largest single source of investment capital in the
United States. This fact has largely been hidden from the American public;
there is a sense that pension fund assets are invisible money which only appears
when one retires.
The second conventional attitude is that capital markets work efficiently,
thus the entrance of any non-financial criteria in investments is inefficient.
Concommitantly, it is assumed that any divergence from traditional investment
policies will reduce portfolio yields. This ideology is pervasive, even if not
always based on facts. Certainly, many capital makets are efficient, but there
are also market imperfections which deny capital to profitable mortgage
markets and productive firms. It is quite possible for pension funds to make
profitable investments, if the investment vehicle is well designed for
underfinanced markets. 0 Nevertheless, the prevailing notion that strategic
investment cannot be profitable is a large barrier to changing traditional
investment policies.
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A third attitude is that strategic investing will cause conflicts of interest
and subject pension funds to political decision making. It is doubtful strategic
investing is amy more political or prone to conflicts of interest than traditional
methods, but the political debate is explicit in a strategic investment policy.
Infact, strategic investing may avoid some of the blatant conflicts of interest
bewteen banks and their commerical clients. Again, the attitude is the
obstacle.
Another conventional wisdom is that strategic investing proponents want
to enhance their own power and do not represent the viewpoints of employees.
In other words, union officials and politicians benefit from strategic
investments at the expense of their membership. This is another attitude which
is difficult to prove either way, because there is no polling of all employees on
their pension fund investments. However, organized employees elect union
officials and do not elect corporate or bank trustees who manage their pension
fund. Because of past union abuses with pension funds, management has tried
to show that they represent the long-term interest of workers better than
elected union officials. The conflicts of interest among corporations and the
poor financial perfomance of professional managers are unknown facts.
The final "conventional wisdom" is that investment experts are the only
ones who can be trusted with pension fund money. Clearly, it is in the interest
of professional money managers to perpetuate this attitude. It also intimidates
union officials and employees from getting involved in the investment process.
The attitude that only experts know what is best and "neutral" for pension fund
investments is patronizing, but a prevalent viewpoint, nonetheless and one tht
serves as a stumbling block to strategic investing. Most of these prevailing
attitudes or conventional wisdom are dubious, however, taken together, they
pose a large obstacle to non-traditional pension fund investment policies.
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SUMMARY
In summary, strategic investing is offered as an alternative to traditional
investment policies because of the past poor financial and social performance
of pension funds. There are a broad rnage of prudent investments, such as
housing mortgages, small business loans and government-backed securities
which are underutilized by pension funds. A strategic investment plicy should
diversify portfolios and account for particular social or economic goals
coinciding with interest of beneficiaries, while maintaining a safe, comptetitve
rate or return. Like any new field, there are tremendous institutional and
ideological obstacles to implementation. In the case of strategic investing,
these obstacles are 1) employer control of funds, 2) institutional management
of funds in which there is no incentive to broaden investment practices, 3) the
lack of information, 4) high informtion costs, 5) difficulties in measuring
performance of a strategically invested fund, 6) consensus problems and, 7)
prevailing attitudes that are captivating, but often false. Despite these
obstacles, a few pension funds have implemented alternative investment
policies. This next chapter will explore how and why the largest of these
strategically invested funds, the AFL-CIO Building Trades and Construction
Union have pursued a non-traditional pension fund investment policy.
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CHAPTER #3
MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS BY AFL-CIO BUILDING TRADES UNIONS
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For over twenty years, unions within the AFL-CIO Building and
Construction Trades Department have strategically invested their pension funds
in mortgages to provide direct benefits to their membership by increasing the
number of unionized construction jobs. Why have these unions been able to
implement strategic pension fund investments when other funds have not?
There are a variety of explanations which enable construction unions to
overcome stategic investment barriers. They include: joint trusteeship, the
creation of institutions and investment vehicles to facilitate their policies and
mutual incentives for labor and management to participate in mortgage
programs. Construction union morrgage programs are "pareto optimal" or what
some call an "ideal type", because all parties benefit from these mortgage
investments. By looking at the "pareto optimal" case, we can better understand
the elements which support the implemetation of strategic investing.
The first section of this chapter gives a brief background on building
trades union pension funds. The next section describes the methods and
programs used by particular union pension funds for mortgage investments. The
last section of this chapter explores reasons for construction union funds
success at overcoming strategic investment obstacles.
BULLING TRADES UNIONS AND THEIR PENSION FUNDS
There are over twnety national construction unions with hudnreds of
locals throughout the United States. Most of them are affiliated with the
Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD) of AFL-CIO. The BCTD
represents about 2.5 million workers. Unions within BCTD are organized around
certain trades and responsibilities in the building sequence. 1 Some of the trades,
such as the carpeneters, steam fitters, painters, plumbers and sheet metal
workers have been nationally organized for over one hundred years. BCTD acts
as a national umbrella organiztion working for the interest of unionized
construction through political lobbying, organizing and research activities.
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Local unions are responsible for negotiating collective bargaining
agreements and making job referrals. Contractors and local unions negotiate
not only on wages but also on hiring and training practices because of the mutal
need "to develop and retain a skilled labor force" and "to preserve job
opportunities for craftsmen". 2
There is a unique set of labor and management relations in construction
caused by the unstable economic conditions the industry faces. Hence,
employment patterns in the construction industry are very different from other
industries. These differences are summarized in The Construction Industry, by
Julian Lange and Daniel Quinn Mills, who characterize construction
employment as follows:
e " Considerable shifting of employees among work sites
* Considerable shifting of employees among employers
* Identification by the employee with his craft or occupation, not with
his employers
* A relatively large proportion of skilled workers
* Much self supervision
* Very unstable employment opportunity
* Dangerous and often difficult work conditions
* Intermixture of employees of different employers in a single project
site
* Construction of non-standard (that is custom-designed) products"
With these employment attributes, collective bargaining for a form of
secure work life is crucial to construction workers. Building trade unions help
mitigate many of the negative consequences of working in the cyclical
construction industry.
93
Construction unions also play an important role in the organization of the
pension fund system. Historically, they have been active in setting up pension
funds and negotiating benefits. Today there are hundreds of construction union
pension funds with total assets of twenty five billion dollars. 4
Construction union pension funds are multi-employer, non-contributory
plans, meaning that there are a number of employers who participate and these
employers make all the contributions to the plan. The amount of contributions
is defined in the collective bargaining agreement, and usually stated as a
certain amount of money per employee (e.g. .50 per hour, per employee). This
defined contribution relieves the employer of guaranteeing a set pension fund
beneift.
All building trade union pension funds are jointly trusteed. Union officials
and employer representatives (who are from contractor associations) generally
appoint three trustees to manage the investments of the fund. Typically, the
trustees turn over the day-to-day managment to a bank, insurance company or
investment firm. Funds with less than five million dollars are often
administered by an insurance company or in-house. The mean amount of assets
in a construction union fund is roughly thirty million dollars, however, there are
many pension funds with less than five million dollars and quite a few with over
one hundred million dollars in assets. Like other pension funds, these assets are
usually invested in stocks and bonds, and trustees take a passive role in the
management of the fund. Recently, however, many building trades union
trustees have taken a more active interest in the management of their fund.
Increasingly, trustees are adding more mortgage investments to their
portfolios to support their own jobs. New union construction jobs also increase
employer contributions to the pension fund, creating "new money" in the fund.
Table #9, from a study by the Construction Industry Research Board, shows the
employment multipliers and the increased pension contributions from certain
levels of mortgage investment. Both the job creation effects and new pension
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TABLE #9
SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS --Alternative Levels of Investment
(1981 dollars)
Level of Mortgage Investment
$100,000 $1 Million $100 Million $1 Billion $2 Billion
New Housing Units
Employment*(person-years)
Business Activity*(thousands)
Income* (thousands)
Tax Revenues(thousands)
Pension Contributions Returned**
1
9
$496
$186
$ 50
$ 7
10
87
$4,966
$1,859
$ 500
$ 68
1,000
8,670
$496,580
$185,940
$ 50,030
$ 6,830
10,000
86,700
$4,965,800
$1,859,400
$ 500,300
$ 68,300
20,000
173,400
$9,931,600
$3,718,800
$1,000,600
$ 136,600
*Includes impacts from housing unit as well as support and related construction. Also
included is the multiplier effect on the general economy of California.
**Pension fund contributions returned to construction trades as a group in proportion to
the hours worked and hourly pension contributions.
Source: Construction Industry Research Board, Summary of Economic Impacts: Investment
in New Housing Mortgages, State of California, CIRB, Los Angeles, CA, September
22, 1981.
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contribtuions are important non-financial considerations to building trades
funds, when evaluating possible investments.
The following section discusses examples of mortgage investment
programs by building trades unions. In all of the building trades unions, the
pension funds are jointly trusteed. These unions mentioned below have found
responsive institutions, such as mortgage bankers or labor-related financial
institutions, to facilitate their mortgage investments. From these examples,
we get a clearer picture of how strategic investing is implemented.
CARPENTERS PENSION FUND TRUST FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
The Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for Northern California has been at
the vanguard of pension fund mortgage investment. Since 1960, the Carpenters
Fund has invested a significant percent of their portfolio in home mortgages in
Northern California supporting their homebuilding jobs. Carpenters Pension
Trust Fund, which includes five thousand employers and thirty five thousand
employees in Northern California, has four hundred sixty million dollars in
assets; and one hundred sixty one million dollars of those assets are real estate
purchase leasebacks and mortgages, of which more than half of these are
residential mortgages. 5
The Carpenters Fund finds its mortgage investments through mortgage
bankers. Trustees hire the mortgage bankers to originate and service the Fund's
mortgage investments. The mortgage bankers present a list of proposed
mortgage investments which fit criteria set by the trustees. The Fund's
investment committee, then, decides on whether or not to make the mortgage
commitments. The trustees of the Carpenters Fund also hire a mortgage
investment consultant who assists the trustees in screening, analyzing,
designing mortgage standards and recommending each loan investment.
The Fund sets the standard that mortgage loans must go to a "contractor
acceptable to the Fund". This is an indirect way (and a way to avoid
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Department of Labor investigations) of saying that all contractors who use the
mortgage must hire union labor. The Fund also sets criteria relting to
geographic diversity of their mortgages. This Carpenters Fund has employees
in the northern two-thirds of California, covering an area over six hundred
miles in length. Thus far, the Fund has been able to sufficiently diversify their
mortgages within Northern California. However, it is now considering making
mortgage investments in Nevada, Arizona and New Mexico to prevent any
losses that may come from investing in one area. The Fund plans to make
mortgage investments in these other western states if they receive
commitments form building trade unions in those states to reciprocate by
investing in mortgages in Northern California.
Currently, the Carpenters Fund loans its mortgage money out at 13.7/8%
whch is not considered a below market rate. (Savings and Loans are offering
mortgages at 14%.) In the past, the Fund has invested in a number of FHA-VA
loans. Recently, the Fund has also invested in shared appreciation mortgages
(SAM's) and are confident SAM's are sound investments for the Fund. 6 In their
commercial mortgages, the Fund has added "equity kickers" to the loan,
whereby the Fund participates in the income generated by the commercial
business. For example, with a mortgage for a hotel, the Fund may stipulate
that it will receie ten percent (10%) of the income generated after the hotel
makes a certain amount of money (i.e. one million dollars).
So far, the Carpenters Fund is pleased with its mortgage investments and
calls the program a "20 year continued success story". Mortgage rates have
skyrocketed in the last couple years, so, many of the Fund's older mortgages
have lower yields and value than its newer ones. Despite some losses due to
high interest rates, Mr. Sutherland, administrator of the Carpenters Fund
stated: "Our returns have been better than those pension funds that have
stayed in equities." 7
It is difficult to judge whether or not the Fund has actually increased the
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number of union construction jobs in Northern California or simply replaced
other investors. The investments in government insured mortgages such as
FHA-VA loans, most likely just displace other investors. However, the Fund's
current mortgage investments, such as its SAM's and "equity kicker" loans,
probably do increase jobs, because they are providing capital when it may
otherwise not be available; these new mortgage instruments are not widely
accepted by other lenders. The Fund is offering money at slightly lower rates
in return for future income from the borrower. The construction industry is at
such a low point, that practically any new mortgages add jobs.
The Carpenters Fund, confident about their own mortgage investments,
encourage other pension funds to make more real estate investments. When
asked why other funds have not followed the Carpenters lead in mortgage
investing, Mr. Sutherland stated that "large funds have been shy about mortgage
investments because of lack of staff (underwriters and appraisers) and the
smaller funds have not had sufficient funds to start a program of their own".8
Mr. Sutherland goes on the say that he believes the Carpenters' success story is
available to all pension funds. He concludes:
"Mortgage and purchase-leaseback investments offer pension
funds safety, consistently higher yields over the years,
diversification and also a constructive purpose. New
construction has to be financed and pension fund investments
can be utilized to assists in keeping America growing and
ading to our nation's economic growth by providing jobs-jobs
not only for the construction industry, but all kinds of jobs."
RETIREMENT FUND TRUST OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPING INDUSTRY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
The largest plumbing pension fund in the nation has announced that it will
get out of equity investments and concentrate on mortgage investments10 A
trustee of the fund stated: "The yield in our equity portfolio is so poor, we feel
we can do a lot better with our first trust deeds."' This Plumbing Fund which
includes ten thousnd active participants and has one hundred eighty one million
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dollars in assets, has adopted a mortgage investment policy to directly increase
new construction. Two-thirds of the Fund's assets are in mortgages which have
financed over one hundred new construction projects in the Los Angeles area.
Like the Carpenters Fund, the Plumbers Retirement Fund hires mortgage
bankers to originate, service and package the mortgages. The mortgage
bankers are instructed by the trustees to look for projects which best utilize
facets of the plumbing trade, "thereby creating jobs and generating additional
revenues for the pension fund".1 2 fhe Plumbers Fund has invested in a number of
apartment buildings and hospitals, projects which require a lot of plumbing
work.
At the end of 1981, the mortgage investments in the Plumbers Fund had a
yield of ten percent (10%), a return with which the trustees are pleased.
Although, the yield is satisfactory, there is some problem with diversification in
this fund. From most investment advisors viewpoint, the Plumbers have too
high a percent (66%) in mortgage investments. One investment manager told
me that he would not recomend more than twelve percent (12%) in mortgages
while another consultant set twenty percent (20%) as a limit. The Department
of Labor is investigating the International Brotherhood of Electical Workers
(IBEW), because some of their locals have over fifty percent (50%) of their
pension fund in mortgage investments, which could violate ERISA
diversification standards. The Plumbers may run into the same trouble. The
trustees of the Plumbers Fund are confident their pension fund mortgage loans
are secure investments. They have hadeno delinquincies on their mortgage
loans in the-fifteen years they have made these investments. Mr. Reed, a
trustee of the Fund, calls the program "extremely successful". They have had a
satisfactory and safe return and have created at least some additional jobs for
their members.
UNION LABOR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (ULLICO), New York, NY
Union Labor Life Insurance Company (ULLICO), a labor-financed
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insurance company established in 1927, has opened a separate mortgage
account, called J for Jobs Account, for union pension fund investment. This is a
pooled mortgage account which stipulates that contractors of the mortgaged
projects employ union labor.
Fifty building trade union pension funds currently invest in the J for Jobs
Account. A union pension fund purchases units in the fund, which initially were
valued at one thousand dollars each. Monthly, the assets of the account are
divided by the total number of outstanding units which produces a new unit
value. This new unit value applies to all new purchases and redemptions. 3 There
is a small annual administration charge of 25/100 of one percent (1%) which is
based on the average account balance of ech participating pension fund, but this
charge is much less than the fees of bank trust departments, investment firms
or other insurance companies.
J for Jobs finds mortgages through regional mortgage correspondents in
over twenty five cities, who are aware of the investment criteria of the
Account. Often they find out about mortgage investment opportunities through
local building trade unions that recommend a construction project in their area
for ULLICO financing.
J for Jobs Account only makes loans on income producing property and
have financed apartment complexes, office buildings, shopping centers,
warehouse buildings, hotels, community centers, health maintenance
organizations and other medial complexes. These mortgages are at market
rates, according to the underwriting and appraising criteria set for the Account.
The Account has over one hundred twenty five million dollars in mortgages.
ULLICO has total assets of eight hundred ninety two million dollars and twenty
seven percent (27%) of their general account for investments is also in
mortgages. 14
The yields on J for Jobs Account have varied. The Account started in
1977
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and their earlier mortgage yields hav suffered from the recent high rates and
some poor investments, but the Account's latest yields have been competitive
with corporate bond returns. Most likely, the Account is not creating new
mortgages because large income producing properties typically have access to
capital. The Account claims to seek out "imaginative opportunities" (i.e.
community center), so possibly a few of their investments are ones that
otherwise would not be financed. However, the Account increases the number
of union construction jobs, especially in the South where there are "right to
work" laws. This Separate Mortgage Account of ULLICO is primarily designed
to stimulate union jobs in the depressed construction industry and at least
according to one ULLICO representative, they are not displacing union jobs, but
adding to them.
HAWAII'S GALZIERS AND GLASS WORKERS PENSION TRUST FUND
The Hawaii Glaziers and Glass Workers Pension Trust Fund has proposed a
member home loan program, currently under review by the Department of
Labor. The Glass Workers Pension Fund with assets worth five million dollars,
want to offer their one hundred fifty eligible members shared appreciation
mortgages (SAM's) in exchange for below market mortgage rates. Unlike the
other programs mentioned, this plan's goal is not to stimulate union jobs, but to
increase housing opportunities for pension fund members.
Under the proposed plan, the mortgage rates would be two-thirds of the
yield sought by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at the weekly auction held
immediately preceeding the closing of the loan15 In addition to the yield to the
fund, the pension plan would receive one-third of the appreciated value of the
home. 6 The appreciation value would be collected when the pension plan
member sells the home or at the end of fifteen years, or which ever comes
first.
An example demostrating how this Glass Worker program would work is
discussed in a Pension & Investment Age article:
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"If the yield sought by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is
seventeen percent (17%), as it was in mid-December (1981),
than the mortgages issued based on this rate would be eleven
point eight percent (11.8%) with an eleven point four percent
(11.4%) yieled to the fund ... The bank (Bank of Hawaii) would
get the difference betwen the mortgage rate and the yield to
the fund and also would receive one point five percent (1.5%)
of the amount of the loan to cover processing fees . . . If the
appreciation on the home was thirty thousand dollars, the
pension fund would get ten thousand dollars and the
homeowner twenty thousand dollars." 7
If the mortgage was ninety percent (90%) of the price of the home and the
property appreciated at six percent (6%) annually, the yield to the fund would
be an additional two percent (2%) per year, making the annual rate of return
thirteen point four percent (13.4%) for these mortgage investments. These are
conservative figures since most mortgages are for seventy to eighty percent
(70% - 80%) of the total price and because an annual appreciation rate of six
percent (6%) may be low for Hawaii.18 The Glass Workers Fund has tried to
designed a program that offers a safe, competitive rate of return and provides
housing to at least a few of their members. If the Department of Labor
approves this program, the Glass Workers may put up to twenty percent (20%)
of their fund in this member home loan program. 19
Most likely, DOL will approve the program as they have already set
regulations for member home loan programs. According to DOL, member home
loans must be:
"(A) available to all such participants and beneficiaries on a
reasonable equivalent basis, (B) not made available to highly
compensated employees, officers or shareholders in an amount
greater than the amount made available to other employees,
(C) are made in accordance with specific provisions regarding
such loans set forth in the plan, (D) bear reasonable rate of
interest and, (E) are adequately secured."2
A favorable DOL ruling may encourage other pension funds to consider
the shared appreciation mortgage as a viable imvestment option.
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT FINANCING
FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Thirteen building trades pension funds have created a mechanism to invest
in union built construction projects in Southern California, called the
Construction Industry Real Estate Development Financing Foundation of
Southern California. The Foundation provides a way for construction union
funds to jointly participate in financing residential and commercial buildings
which will be constructed by members of the participating unions. Monthly, the
building trades within the Foundation are presented with potential investments
by mortgage brokers. Each member fund can invest a certain share in a
mortgage or decline to participate in that particular project. The pension funds
have the option to invest in those projects which especially benefit ltheir
members.
The Foundation ws established in August, 1980 with combined assets over
two billion dollars from the thirteen trusts. Two pension trusts, the Carpenters
and the Plumbers were active in organizing the Foundation. Both of these
unions already were investing a significant portion of their assets in mortgages
and saw the Foundation as a means to encourage other trade unions to make
more mortgage investments to support local union construction jobs. Smaller
funds were encouraged to join because they would benefit from participating in
large loans they otherwise could not finance.
The Foundation has been propelled by Albert Brundage, an attorney for a
San Francisco firm, Daivs, Frominger, Jessinger, as well as the California State
Building Trades and the Union Mortgage Bankeers, the mortgage company hired
by the Foundation. Brundage was also a member of the California Public
Investment Task Force and has been called "the prime mover in setting up the
Foundation". He continues to be the spokesperson for the Foundation and plays
an active role in the organization as well as working to set up other Foundations
across the country. There is at least discussion about other Foundations for
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mortgage investment by building trades in Boston, Buffalo, Baltimore, San
Francisco, San Diego and Portland.
Thus far, the Foundation in Southern California is the only one actively
making mortgage investments. Since August, 1980, the Foundation has invested
over one hundred sixty million dollars in Southern California mortgages.
Potential investments are brought to the attention of the Foundation by two
mortgage banking companies,Union Mortgage Bankers and Wallace Moyer
Company. Both of these firms primarily have unions as clients. The Foundation
must work through mortgage banking firms to avoid any allegations of dealing
with "parties in interest". Because contractors participate as representatives
of pension trusts, and potentially could directly benefit from some mortgage
investments, the Foundation must document that there is an independent
mortgage selection process. These experienced mortgage companies also
screen and evaluate a wide range of different projects.
Each member pension fund, sends two trustees, one from labor and one
from management, to monthly meetings, where the mortgage bankers present
potential investments. The pension funds independently decide whether they
want to invest in a mortgage. "This arrangement has the advantage of involving
a large number of trusts, while allowing trustees to make individual decisions on
the prudence of each investment", says Al Brundage. 2 1'ypically, five or six of
the pension funds decide to subscribe to the mortgage investment. When a loan
is fully subscribed, meaning enough pension funds participate to cover the
mortgage investment, all the parties enter into a "Transaction Trust". Each
project has a separate "Transaction Trust" which is administered by Crocker
Bank. The Transaction Trust defines the agreement to collectively finance the
mortgage by the participating pension funds.
Each participating fund has one unit for every one hundred thousand
dollars contributed to the Trust (the mortgage investment).2 2The pension funds
have one vote for every unit they own. The mortgage can be liquidated upon a
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decision by the pension funds holding at least seventy five percent (75%) of the
total units of the Trust. Crocker Bank is responsible for servicing each Trust.
They distribute earnings generated by each Transaction Trust to the
contributing pension funds and also provide regular balance sheets and income
statements to the Foundation. If the mortgage is not fully subscribed,
participating perions funds can increase their share or outside funds, banks, or
public pension funds can be brought in on specific proposals. 23
As of February, 1982, the Foundation had entered into thrity two
Transaction Trusts, for mortgages on residential and comercial buildings. Table
#10 shows the type of mortgage, the yield, the amount of the transaction, and
the participating pension funds of the thirty two financed projects by the
Foundation. The Foundation fee on the chart is a non-refundable lender fee to
cover the borrowers commitment and the costs incurred by the foundation for
business advice, normal legal expenses and other adminstrative costs. The
mortgages are approximately eighty percent (80%) of the price of the project.
Most of the projects have mortgages between thre to five million dollars.
Over half of the projects listed on Table #10 are for residential
mortgages. The code on the chart for hosuing is SFR and it refers to tract
homes or condominium complexes. For example, Transaction Trust #2 with a
mortgage for seven point two million dollars may finance seventy single family
residences, either tract homes or condominiums. The Foundation has set price
ceilings on the homes or condos ranging from one hundred thousand dollars to
one hundred fifty thousand dollars. "The aim is to keep contractors from using
pension fund money to underwrite luxury development beyond the reach of
unionists and their families.n24I'hese residential mortgages are twleve point five
percent (12.5%), which is a bargain for a borrower, however, the Foundation and
the Department of Labor feels these mortgages have a secure and reasonable
return while providing an additional benefit of more union jobs and possibly
increasing the number of homes for middle income buyers.
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California is one of the few places in the United States that employs
primarily union labor in housing construction. There is a history of tract
housing in California which traditionally has been built by union labor. In most
other parts of the country, residential construction is built by non-union
workers. Therefore, building trade unions in other states typically will not
invest in any residential construction. In Boston, where a Foundation has
recently been established, the construction union pension funds will not invest
in home mortgages because there are few Boston-area residential contractors
who hire union labor. In Maine, there are only two housing contractors who
employ union construction workers. Thus, the Southern California Foundation
has a unique advantage because they can diversify their portfolio with
residential mortgages and potentially stimulate the local housing industry.
The Foundation has also made a number of commercial and industrial
mortgages. Most of these commercial loans include participation in the annual
income of property in exchange for an initial below market interest rate.
Lenders and borrowers agree on a below market interest rate, plus a specific
percent of all increases in the owners gross income after a determined base
figure. For example, on a five story office building project, with a $5.2 million
mortgage, the participating pension fund members and the developer agree on
a thirteen and one half percent (13.5%) interest rate plus thirty percent (30%)
of the property's gross income over $998,400.00. With this "equity kicker", the
mortgage's average yield over the life of the loan would be 16.52%?5 The
Foundation first determines their desired yield on the project and then
calculates the needed "equity kicker" or participation in gross income, to
receive the expeected return. The Southern California Foundation also has
financed a shared appreciation commercial mortgage in which contributing
pension trusts participate in the sale proceeds. To date, there have been no
foreclosures on any of the mortgages, residential or commercial financed by the
Foundation.
The Fotdation has carefully designed its mortgage investment policies to
comply with ERISA regulations. The Department of Labor has already
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conducted an investigation into the policies of the Foundation and in June, 1981,
closed the case finding no ERISA violations. DOL was concerned that the
pension funds in the Foundation would only consider "union construction
projects in Southern California which would be artificially limiting their
potential investment opportunities for non-economic reasons."29 qnstead the DOL
decided that the Foundation "broadens rather than restricts the range of
investment opportunities available for plans",27especially since each plan
independently decides whether to invest in a mortgage and evaluates the
Foundation's mortgage proposals against other possible investments.
The Department of Labor raised a concern about who takes fiduciary
responsiblity in the Foundation. The legal documents relieve the Foundation
and the mortgage bankers from any fiduciary responsibility. Hwever, this
statement in the documents may not be too important, because fiduciary
responsibility refers to a function not a structure in a document. If the
mortgage bankers act or function as fiduciaries according to ERISA section 3
(21), then, they can be liable as fiduciaries, even though the documents may
state otherwise. The DOL stated that upon the completion of a different
investigation, "it may be possible for the Department to determine whether the
Foundation or the mortgage bankers, in practice, maintain a fiduciary
relationship to specific employee beneift plans"2 8 Most likely, if someone
wanted to sue the Foundation over one of its investments, trustees of
participating pension plans, investment advisors, mortgage bankers and the
Foundation itself, could all be liable as fiduciaries.
The DOL's investigation did not mention the legal issues of antitrust, but
they are relevant to the Foundation case. It is possible that the clause
requiring union labor on all Foundation mortgages could be interpreted as a
"restraint of free trade" and in violation of antitrust laws. The union clause
was written to avoid legal hassles. It states:
"Developer recognizes Lender's concern tht the work
stoppages resulting from union organizational efforts or
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picketing of from the traditional refusal of union members to
work alongside non-union workmen on the same construction
job site might unforseeably extend the time of completion of
the project or impair or jeopardize the underlying security
interest of Lender or both. Therefore as material
consideration for this Commitment, Developer hereby
represents and agrees; . . . that said general contractors and
subcontractors shall each be signatory to an appropriate
current collective bargaining agreement with an appropriate
labor organization affiliated with the Building and
Construction Trades DeparWent, AFL-CIO or International
Brotherhood of Teamsters."
Although, the beginning of the union clause obscures the intentions of the
Foundation, it is clear from the Foundation documents that a goal of the
organization is to promote unionized construction work. There are antitrust
questions that have yet to be pursued, but the Foundation is sufficiently
concerned that they have sought legal guidance on the matter. The fear is that
the largest non-unionized contractor association, Associated Building
Contractors (ABC) would start a law suit against the Foundation.
The Foundation has taken many of the necessary precuations to insure
that their investments are prudent and have reasonable rates of return. All of
the investments by the Foundation are for permanent financing which is less
risky than construction loans. Although, there has been some discussion about
building trade investment in construction loans. The pension fund has actually
financed a construction loan. The California state penion funds have talked
with members of the Foundation about creating a joint construction loan and
permanent financing mortgage program with the state and building trades
pension funds. Any program of this nature would have provisions to minimize
risk and guarantee a secure rate of return to both the public and union pension
fund.
The members of the Foundation and the California state pension funds are
currently working on a joint residential mortgage program. Under this program,
the building trade union funds would invest in the permanent financing of a
residential mortgage and then sell the mortgage to the California state pension
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fund. The union would "roll over" mortgage investments in one or two years
instead of twenty five years, allowing them to invest in similar projects and
create more jobs for their members 0 The state pension fund would assist in
creating a secondary mortgage market for the Foundation mortgages.
The state of California has its own motives for working with the
Foundation. The construction industry has one of the highest employment
multipliers of any industry. Investment in construction generates additions to
the state and local tax base. A study by California Department of Water
Resources found that for every job created in the construction industry, an
additional 2.66 jobs are created in linked industries. 3 11f the state and the
Foundation jointly participate in pension fund construction investment to
stimulate employment in California, the mortgage investments must be
targetted so as not to displace private investors.
The Foundation wants to create new union jobs and avoid replacing a
mortgage investment in which union labor would otherwise be hired. One way
to avoid displacement is to geographically target investment. For example, the
Foundation could target a mortgage investment in a traditionally non-unionized
area like Fresno, California, where a contractor may normally use non-union
labor, but with a Foundation agreement will hire union workers. It is even
possible that potential financing from the building trades Foundation would
encourage a contractor to sign a collective bargaining agreement with a
construction union. A major goal of the Foundation is to support building trade
union jobs, in a time when open shop (non-unionized) construction is increasing.
The Foundation is an innovative mechanism to strategically invest pension funds
providing a safe rate of return and increasing employment security for union
members.
OVERCOMING STRATEGIC INVESTMENT BARRIERS
There are many other building trades mortgage investment programs
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similar to the ones mentioned. Construction union-related pension funds in
Milwaukee, St. Paul, Miami, Phoenix, Rochester and San Francisco have set
aside a portion of their assets for mortgage investments. This nationwide
activity points to the fact that it is easier for the building trades union to
pursue a strategic investment policy thatn it is for other organized workers.
There are three major reasons why many building trade unions have
managed to overcome strategic investment obstacles. First, there are mutual
incentives for labor and management to invest in mortgages. Second,
construction union-related funds are jointly trusteed and third, the funds have
created mechanisms to facilitate strategic investments.
MUTUAL INCENTIVES
For the construction union funds, there is an obvious connection between
new mortgage investment and the creation of construction jobs. Mortgage
investments for union job creation are mutually beneficial to employers and
employees who participate in the fund. Both union workers and the contractors
who hire them benefit from the increased amount of work. The mortgage
investment programs offer contractors who employ union labor an edge over
their competitors who only hire non-union employees.
Union contractors and union labor have another incentive to participate in
mortgage programs. The unionized construction sector is facing severe
unemployment, threatening the livelihood of both union employers and
employees, therefore, any job creating investments are welcome. The last few
years, has witnessed a tremendous expansion of the open shop and an assault on
the legal protections union construction workers have had, such as the Davis-
Bacon Act 3 2 The President of the International Union of Operating Engineers
(IUOE) writes about the depressed constrcution industry:
"we (building trades) are experiencing massive unemployment
in the construction industry . . . construction workers lucky
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enough to have a job are being forced to give up wage
increases instead of receiving their fair share of these rising
corporate profits. We see non-union contractors underbidding
union wages by two, three, four and more dollars. Ten years
ago, the hiring hall was respected. Today a huge non-union
workface is being created and there is no stability in labor
relations." 33.
According to many union officials, there has been a planned campaign by
major corporations in this country, who are also the largest industrial
construction users, to destroy the building trades. 3 4 Unions point to a concerted
effort carried out through the Business Roundtable, U.S. chamber of Commerce
and non-union contractor associations to lower construction costs by supporting
non-union contractors, ignoring traditional bargaining practices and attacking
labor laws on overtime, working conditions and wages. The Business Roundtable
has set up a Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable, headed by teh
chairman of U.S. Steel, and has published two volumes of a book titled
Coming to Grips with Some Major Problems in the Construction Industry. These
books provide contractors information on labor issues and the restoration of the
management role in construction work. They tell developers and contactors
that union hiring halls give unions too much power over the personnel functions,
and thus, recommend the creation of management operated data banks for job
referrals3 5One speaker at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce conference on the
construction industry suggested a national hiring hall where the workforce is
"computerized, inventoried, recruited, trained, referred and managed by
professionals as a personnel office for industrial contactors." 3 6
The campaign to undercut union construction work has been successful,
spawning the burgeoning open shop mevement, changes in hiring practices and
three bills pending in Congress to repeal the Davis-Bacon Act. Naturally, these
trends are frightening to union construction workers. Contractors which have
collective bargaining agrements with union workers also fear losing work and
income to non-union contractors. Thus, both union workers and contractors
have incentive to participate in mortgage investment programs to stimulate
union
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contruction work.
Because there is a clear connection between mortgage investment and
employment security, the building trades overcome some of the "conventional
wisdom" obstacles. For example, there is little question that union officials
represent the interest of their membership by investing in mortgages. No one
has accused union trustees of pension funds with mortgage programs, of acting
in their own self interest at the expense of their membership. Employer and
employee trustees have the same goal - - to maintain a safe rate of return and
increase union construction jobs, especially during a time when there is an
attack against the unionized construction sector. This mutual goal facilitates
strategic investing.
JOINT TRUSTEESHIP
Joint trusteeship gives the building trades the power to implement
strategic investing. Otherwise, employees would have to depend on their
employers benevolence to invst pension funds in workers interests. It is
impossible to know whether or not employers would invest in mortgages if the
building trades did not have jointly trusteed funds. Certainly, as we saw in the
last section, there are incentives for the employer to invest in mortgages.
Joint trusteeship, however, encourages the pension fund to invest in mortgages
which support union jobs. Without joint trusteeship, contractors may invest in
mortgages, but they have more incentive to go "double breasted", hiring non-
union constuction labor on the pension fund mortgage investment. Contractors
could hire non-union labor at cheaper cost and feel little responsibility to the
union. Thus, without joint trusteeship, it is still possible employers would invest
pension fund money in mortgages, but not necessarily in projects which support
union jobs. Joint trusteeship helps to insure that pension funds are invested in
the employees interest.
Some forms of strategic investing by the building trdes require joint
trusteeship. For example, the Hawaii Glaziers Pension Fund would not invest in
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home mortgages for employees if they had a solely-employer invested fund.
There would be no incentive for employers to design a program to create
housing opportunities for employees. Also an employer-invested fund would
have no incentive to divest from blatantly anti-union corporations. Employee
trustees have the incentive to make investments with added social and
economic benefits for plan participants.
Joint trusteeship also overcomes "conventional wisdom" obstacles. Union
trustees realize that pension funds are relatively large pools of capital as well
as retirement income, because they are part of the investment process. The
investment process is demystified for union trustees, thus, they are less
intimidated about offering innovative investment ideas. With joint control,
there is at least a potential for strategic invetsing, while with employer
controlled funds, there are no incentives to design strategic investment
programs for the benefit of union members.
INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENT VEHICLES TO FACILITATE STRATEGIC INVESTING
Union trustees have had to design innovative programs and invest in
supportive institutions to overcome strategic investment barriers. Some unions
have given a portion of their funds to a non-traditional investment company like
Union Labor Life Insurance Company (ULLICO) or union-owned banks. These
institutions are more inclined thatn traditional banks to look at non-financial
consequences of their investments. They are also more likely to be familiar
with mortgage instruments, because they have experience in such investments.
The building trades have also used mortgage bankers to locate potential
investments. Mortgage bankers help to overcome the information barriers
concerning real estate investments. Some of the builing trades have taken
advantage of mortgage pooling mechanisms, such as ULLICO's special mortgage
account, Prudential's separate union mortgage account and the Southern
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California Foundation. The Foundation, especially, is an innovative mechanism
designed by union representatives which facilitates strategic investiung. If the
Foundation hooks up with public pension funds in mortgage investing, they may
create yet another type of institutional mechanism. At least one building
trades fund has proposed investing in residential shared appreciation mortgages,
a new investment vehicle to provide a reasonable rate of return to the fund and
possibly increase housing opportunities.
All of these mechanisms, union banks, separate accounts, mortgage
bankers and mortgage pools get around traditional institutional barriers and
information obstacles against mortgages. It is important to note that joint
trusteeship provides the incentive to find institutions and investment
mechanisms which facilitate strategic investing. The connection between joint
trusteeship and supportive institutions to encourage strategic investing will be
explored further in the next chapter.
SUMMARY
Unlike the vast majority of pension funds, the building trades have
strategically invested their assets in mortgages to support their own jobs.
Clearly, the connection between a mortgage investment and a job opportunity
makes it much easier for building trades to strategically invest their pension
funds. There are three other reasons why the building trades have overcome
strategic investment obstacles. First, there are mutual economic incentives
for both , employer and employee trustees to participate in mortgage
investments. Second, joint trusteeship has given the building trades the power
to implement strategic investment policies. Third, in order to make non-
financial investments, the building trades have used existing institutions, like
mortgage banking companies and created their own investment vehicles, such as
mortgage pools, separate accounts, and organizations like the Foundation.
Although, the building trades' mortgage investments are a "pareto
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optimal" example of strategic investing, the case presents the elements which
support a strategic investment policy. The final chapter explores how these
policies and institutions for overcoming strategic investment obstacles are
applicable and practical for other pension funds interested in changing
traditional investment practices.
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CHAPTER #4
JOINT CONTROL AND NEW INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS
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From the building trades case, we learn that it is much easier to
implement strategic investing if there are: 1) clear connections between the
investment and your own job opportunity, 2) mutual incentives for employer
and employee to participate, 3) joint trusteeship and, 4) institutions to
facilitate the non-traditional investments. The capability to directly invest in
ones own job and the opportunity for mutual incentives for employers and
employees are specific to the building trades funds. But, the last two elements,
joint trusteeship and developing institions to facilitate innovative investment
policies are common to all the other examples of strategic investing. The
experiments with strategic investing, discussed in the two previous chapters,
show that employee participation in pension management and responsive
investment institutions are crucial to implement non-traditional investment
policies.
Having identified the common and necessary elements which support
strategic investing, we need to look at how workers can first attain more
control over their penison funds and then use new investment mechanisms. This
chapter concentrates on the intermediate steps needed to gain more worker
control and build responsive institutions for pension fund investing. The first
section describes how a few unions have attained joint trusteeship. Its primary
focus is on the alternatives to joint trusteeship when the former is unrealistic.
These alternatives represent ways employees can obtain a voice in the
management of their pension fund when joint trusteeship is not an opetion. The
second section suggests alternative inyestment mechanisms which overcome
information barriers and facilitate strategic investing. The chapter concludes
with recommendations for future research in the emerging field of "strategic
investing".
JOINT MANAGEMENT
The United States is characterized by diffuse, fragmented political
decisionmaking and highly concentrated economic and investment
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decision making. There are democratic processes for making political decisions
concerning capital and land owned in common by the public. But, when it
comes to pension funds, which are also social capital, technically, owned by
workers, democratic processes over investment decisions hardly exist. The idea
that workers own pension fund assets has become accepted to the point that
even conservative management consultant, Peter Drucker, author of The
Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, wrote:
"If "socialism" is defined as "ownership of the means of
production by the workers" - and this is both the orthodox and
the only rigorous definition - then the United States is the
first truly "socialist" country. Through their pension funds,
employees of American business today own at least twenty
five percent (25%) of its equity capital, which is more thatn
enough for control . . .1
But, as we have seen, this "ownership" means little, because most workers
have no way to exercise typical ownership rights. "The worker cannot borrow
the money, trade it, use it as collateral or do any of the other things ownership
normally allows . . . These decisions are made on the worker's behalf by trust
departments of America's giant banks", writes Derek Shearer and Martin
Carnoy in Economic Democracy. 2
Typically, workers in the United States have had little say in economic
production and investment decisions. In contrast, European countries have
more of a tradition of union-management cooperation and involvement in
economic decisions. It follows, then, that joint management of pension funds is
much more prevalent in Europe. Infact, in many Western European countries,
joint management is required by law. 4
In the United States private and public employee unions are just beginning
to negotiate for more control in economic production decisions in exchange for
wage concessions. The larger unions are also starting to push for more of a
voice in pension management decisions. For most unions with single-employer
pension plans, joint trusteeship is currently not a realistic option. And for non-
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unionized employees, the alternatives to joint trusteeship may also be
unrealistic, because there is no negotiation process over pension fund
management. Thus, the steps toward gaining more control over pension fund
investment will be most useful or practical to workers who can bargain over
pension management issues.
Employers will not give up full control of pension funds easily. According
to Randy Barber, the expert in this field, there are realistically only two
opportunities for a union to succssfully negotiate for joint trusteeship of a
pension fund. The first opportunity is at the creation of the pension plan. It is
much easier to start the plan with joint trusteeship thatn trying to wrest
control from employers once the plan has been in operation. The second
opporunity is when the pension plan is being reorganized. During this time,
employers may be more open to changing the management of the fund. For
example, if a pension fund switches from a defined-benefit plan to defined-
contribution plan, a union would have more of a claim to joint trusteeship. If a
union represents workers in a company where a pension plan is just starting or
being reorganized, the union has a good opportunity to negotiate with the
employer for joint control.
The first step toward preparing for a negotiation process is to secure
information on the pension plan if it exists.
The Industrial Union Department of AFL-CIO lists the type of information
a union should request from an employer. It includes:
e "a list of the investments of the fund
* the earnings of each investment
* the original purchase price and current market value of
each investment
* the identity of firms managing the fund and fees paid to
such managers
* the relationships between the firms managing the funds
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and those financial institutions that service the employer
* an itemized breakdown of the cost of administering the
fund
* instructions trustees have given to investment managers
* how stock voting rights have been exercisedn 6
Some of this information can be obtained from annual reports on pension
fund investments, filed by every employer with DOL, called "5500 forms".
These "5500" reports are available to workers through their employer or through
DOL. Unfortunately, the "5500" forms are cumbersome and not always
accurate or up-to-date. Researchers usually use the Money Market Directory
to verify investment manager information on the "5500" forms7 The best source
of information on a particular pension fund investments are the employers own
records. Access to this information is crucial to taking further steps toward
joint administration of a pension fund.
Once the union or employees have accurate information and have
seriously researched the operation of their pension plan, they potentially can
negotiate for joint trusteeship or alternative forms of employee participation in
pension fund administration. A handful of unions have successfully negotiated
for joint trusteeship in a single employer plan. They may serve as a model for
other pension funds which have the realistic opportunities to negotiate for joint
control. For example, the Amalgamated Transit Union negotiated joint
trusteeship agreements in the 1950's with Greyhound Corporation.8 The trustee
board has responsibility for administering the plan, determining benefits,
selection of investment managers and acutaries and setting investment policies.
Another example involves the Newspaper Guild Local 3 which went on strike at
the New York Times and one of its main demands was joint administration of
the Times pension fund. 9 After a long strike, in 1965, the Times agreed to set up
a jointly trusteed pension fund administered by four union and four managment
trustees. Other Newspaper Guild affiliates have since gained joint control of
pension funds with other newspapers throughout the country.
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The Airline Pilots Association (ALP A) has successfully negotiated with
Eastern Air Lines, TWA, Pan Am, United and Republic for joint trusteeship of
their pension funds. The joint retirement boards have the "right to establish,
select, review or change any assumptions, goals or procedures adopted under
the Plans, and to review any individual or firm employed to assume duties and
obligations regarding said assumptions, goals or procedures under the Plan . . .
and the power to select, approve, terminate or replace any Trustee, Investment
Manager, Actuary, Insuring Company or Consultant as the case may be."1 hese
examples demonstrate that successful negotiations for joint control is quite
possible, expecially if the timing is at the creation of the plan or when it is
being reworked. If negotiating for joint control is too big a leap or an
unrealistic option, there are a variety of alternative ways workers can increase
their participation in pension fund management. For example, the union might
negotiate to participate in the selection of investment managers. Also, the
union may arrange to review the performance of investment managers. The
union could set up a tracking system to monitor investment managers'
performance.
Another option, suggested in the AFL-CIO report on pension funds, is for
unions to negotiate an agreement specifying that a certain portion of the fund's
assets be invested in residential mortgages.' 'This type of agreement is similar
to the one reached by the UAW and Chrysler.
Still another strategy is for the union to arrange to participate in the
selection of actuaries who evaluate the amount of employer contributions
needed to properly fund the plan. The actuarial assumptions determine the
amount of money in the pension fund for benefits. It would be an especially
important step toward joint administration, for the union to participate in
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deciding the "interest assumptions" set by the actuary. Interest assumptions
represent the income the plan expects to produce through its investments. For
example, Eastern Air Lines' one billion dollar pension fund had an interest rate
assumption of seven percent (7%) on its investments. Eastern, recently,
increased their interest rate assumption to nine percent (9%) which had the
effect of reducing their contribution to the pension fund12Infact, the increased
interest assumption created a quarterly profit for Eastern when they otherwise
would not have had one. Pension & Investment Age is quoted as saying tht "a
$5.9 million gain from updating actuarial assumptions meant the big difference
between the "black ink and the red ink" for Eastern. 13This interest assumption
of nine percent (9%) is very high, considering the average interest assumption
for the top one thousand corporations in 1980 was six point three percent (6.3%). 14
If the union participates in the selection of actuarial assumptions, they can
decide if the company is manipulating their money to the detriment of their
own retirement benefits.
The Airline Pilots Association are now negotiating an agreement with
Eastern Air Lines to allow the union and employer to each appoint an actuary.
Together, the acutaries would make recommendations to the trustees on
interest assumptions, wage and salary assumptions and required employer
contributions. 1 5The union has proposed joint acutuaries in light of Eastern's
increased interest assumptions. One union official was quoted by Labor and
Investments as saying:
"We negotiated a level of pension benefits based on calculated
cost to the company. The company then turned around and
raised its interest assumptions, thus saving it a significant
amount of money in terms of total labor costs. But we gave
up other potential benefits on the basis of the old calculations.
We think it is extremely important for us to have a role in
setting interest assumptions since they ,an affect the whole
range of benefits our members receive."
Another intermediate step toward joint administration involves unions
exercising equity voting rights on the stock their pension fund holds. Usually,
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management votes proxies or abstains without any input from workers. A
union may want to get involved in voting on stockholder issues to enhance the
security of the stock and to influence corporate policies which are of interest
to beneficiaries.17 Many different pension funds must coordinate their stock
voting to win a shareholder resolution.
Already, a number of public pension funds and jointly trusteed funds have
coordinated their stock voting on "social issue" resolutions such as South
Africa-related investments, nuclear power, miltary conversion, redlining, the
infant formula issue, domestic labor practices and trade with repressive
governments. 1 8 Recently, three California pension funds voted three hundred
fifty thousand shares of their stock in U.S. Steel against that company's
takeover of Marathon Oil. If enough pension funds organized around stock
voting, shareholder resolutions and proxy voting they could influence corporate
policy and even be used as a tool for organizing and bargaining effortls First,
however, employees must bargain for the right to participate in the voting of
their pension fund's stock. A least, workers should arrange to have access to
their employers proxy voting records.
A few public pension funds have attempted to elect a representative to
the Board of Directors of a company in which the fund is a primary stockholder.
Most top stockholders have some say or control in corporate rights to a portion
of control of the companies in which they are large stockholders. There are
exceptions, however. Hawaii's public pension fund elected a representative of
their fund to the Board of Directors of the Hawaiian Independent Refinery, a
company in which the pension fund owns sixteen percent (16%) of the stock.
California's pension fund ran two candidates for corporate directorship in Bank
of America, in which the fund is among the top five stockholders. 2 QAny wealthy
individual that is the fourth largest stockholder of Bank of America is sure
going to be on the board", said one state official defending the pension fund's
move to seek corporate directorship. 2 1 If California's state pension fund
coordinated its voting with the University of California and Los Angeles County
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Retirement System, they would have the potential to elect memers to boards of
companies. Private corporations resist having public pension fund
representatives on their Boards. It is quite possible that a public pension fund
representative may have different views about corporate planning than
businesspeople and bankers who traditionally are on Boards. Nathan Gardels,
chair of the California Public Investment Task Force referred to this different
viewpoint in an Investment Age article:
"Perhaps if California public employees had more direct input
on major decisions, General Motors might have more fuel
efficient fleets of automobiles and General Motors would be
better off in the marketplace today and their shareholders
would be getting a better return on their investment." 2 2
The implication is that a public employee retirement fund representative may
take more of an interest in long-range economic planning and profitability than
those who typically are corporate directors.
Even if public employee representatives do not have different economic
planning viewpoints from traditional directors, at least the pension fund is
excersising its ownership rights by acquiring a portion of control of the
company. In 1976, two public pension funds in Pennsylvania financed a one
hundrd thirty five million dollar loan to Volkswagon to encourage them to
locate a new plant in the state. The public pension funds received no
controlling influence in the operations of Volkswagon. "At least in the private
sector, when banks sink hundreds of million of capital dollars into a venture,
they demnad and receive a degree of control over the operations in return", said
Randy Barber. He continued: "At the minimum they often get a director or
two placed on the Board of the company. All Pennsylvania received was a
pledge by Volkswagon to pay interest on its one hundred thirty five million
dollar outstanding loan and a few thousand jobs brought into the state, jobs that
Volkswagon could decide to move out of the state five or ten years hence if the
company receives a better deal from some other state or country.12 3 Public
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pension funds, expecially those with employee representatives as trustees are
just now beginning to push for their stock ownership rights and are considering
electing its members to company boards.
Private pension funds are usually not large enough to elect
representatives to corporate directorships. Several pension funds would have to
coordinate a strategy for a successful Board election of a pension fund
representative. Again, first the employees must have an agreement with their
employers that worker representatives have to power to vote on shareholder
actions such as resolutions and election drives.
These four strategies, 1) reviewing investment managers, 2)
arrangements to set aside a portion of the funds assets for a specific reason such
as residential mortgage investment, 3) participating in the selection of
actuaries, and, 4) voting the stock the pension fund holds, have all been
experimented with by different unions. The best strategy for a particular
pension fund depends on the size of that fund, the interests of the union
members and the willingness of the employer to negotiate on pension fund
management issues. For example, a small pension fund would not pursue issues
about voting stock or setting aside a portion of assets for mortgages, because
they would not have enough assets to make those strategies worthwhile. Thus,
the strategy which offers the most amount of employee input in management
decisions varies depending on particular pension funds.
Arrangments between employees and management to vote on shareholder
issues, or review investment managers or appoint actuaries are all intermediate
steps toward joint tursteeship. Joint trusteeship includes the power to vote on
all the issues mentioned above and have a voice in investment policies.
A goal of any union interested in strategic investing should be joint
control of the penison fund, but if that is not a realistic option, there are
alternative measures, such as access to information, arrangements to review
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investment managers and actuaries or the right to vote on shareholder issues,
which may eventually lead to joint trausteeship, and at least give wokers more
of a voice in the management of their pension fund.
INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPORT STRATEGIC INVESTING
Joint trusteeship by itself does not lead to strategic investing, and there
are many jointly trusteed funds which have not made any strategic investments.
Supportive and responsive institutions are needed to implement strategic
investing. By "supportive and responsive", we specially mean that there is a
need for institutions which 1) overcome information barriers, and, 2)
facilitate non-traditional investments.
INSTITUTIONS TO OVERCOME INFORMATION BARRIERS
New institutions which provide information on pension funds need to be
created. This section will first discuss information organizations which already
exist. Second, we will look at two necessary information organizations which
are not yet developed. Both existing and suggested organizations can serve as
models for pension funds interested in designing their own organization to
overcome information barriers.
The AFL-CIO has organized two vehicles, a trustee training program and
a newsletter, to increase information on pension fund management, for thier
membership.
The AFL-CIO has recognized that union trustees need education and
training programs if they are to participate in strategic investing. The George
Meany Center for Labor Studies has recently scheduled two-day pension
seminars for union trustees. The seminars have sessions on The Need for an
Expanded Investment Policy, Pension Fund Investments, Principles of Pension
Planning, the Impact of ERISA and Financial Analysis2 4 Although the training
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seminars are geared toward union trustees, union representatives who do not
have direct participation in pension fund management are encouraged to attend.
The AFL-CIO pension fund report states:
"Armed with better knowledge and information concerning
investment policy, representatives of unions without
management rights will be better able to use the means at
their command to obtain information and even influence
investment policies followed by the employer managers of the
pension funds covering their members.5
The AFL-CIO has also participated in the creation of a nationwide
monthly newsletter, Labor and Investments, which provides information on
public and private pension fund investment issues. Labor and Investments has
articles on strategic investing and is one of the best written resources for
unions interested in taking more control over the management of their pension
fund.
At the state level, California has recently set up a pension fund
information organization, called the Pension Investment Unit (PIU), which is
located in the Office of Planning and Research. The PIU serves as a
clearinghouse on state pension investment issues, conducts research, develops
proposals and has the large job of gradually implementing the Public Investment
Task Force recommendations. To implement the recommendations, the PIU
must draft legislation, provide supporting research and help coordinate
innovative pilot investments allowed under existing state laws. 2 6If the PIU
remains adequately funded, they could provide needed information on pension
fund investments to state and local employees and trustees. Governor Brown
has also created a Council of Pension Trustees and Managers which includes
persons at decision making levels in the state public teacher and employee
pension fund system. The Council meets to hear and advise about potential new
investment vehicles. 7
There are information organizations which have been suggested, but not
yet implemented. For example, the AFL-CIO report on pension funds discusses
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creating a centralized system for coordinating the exercise of shareholder
rights, which would be operated by the AFL-CIO. This information organization
would keep abreast of shareholder issues in certain companies. It also could
develop its own resolutions and disseminate information about shareholder
actions which are in the general interests of the labor movement. The staff
would also work on alerting unions to "companies that were deemed particularly
unworthy-or worthy- of even the appearance of union support through
investment or stock purchase.", 28This same organization should also provide
workers with information on how to find out about the investments of their
pension fund. For example, staff could help locate "5500" forms and assist in
interpreting them.
The New York State Building Trades have also suggested creating a
pension fund information organization. Infact, they have adopted a resolution
to establish a statewide coordinating committee for the exchange of investment
information, but the committee has not yet been formed. According to the
resolution, this committee will:
1) "collect current data on Building Trades Funds in the
state
2) review existing investment vehicles and circulate lists of
investments for the consideration of various trusts which
meet the Prudent Man Test and advance the use of union
labor in this state
3) act as a coordinator in putting together diverse groups of
trustees by geographical or other grouping to foster
common programs of investment
4) conduct economic studies such as the effect of
investment on employment and on Fund soundness
5) establish machinery to deciminate in cogent, useable form
some or all of the information gathered in subparagraph
1-4
6) work with government agencies to advance their support
of its projects and utilization of guarantees to protect
trustees investments and to foster a National policy which
recognizes the validity of investing both 2or full return
and the advancement of the participants."
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Both of these suggested information organizations should be developed.
Finally, there are organizations that need to be created which have not
yet been formally suggested. For example, an information organization should
be developed at the local level as well as at the state and national level.
Several unions in a particular area could create an information network and
even each contribute a small amount of money for one staff person to keep
abreast of investment issues. This staff person could inform pension funds
about particularly profitable local investments, inform members of the unions
as to where their money is invested and answer general pension fund investment
questions. Data on the financial performance of pension funds, would be
especially useful and could cut down on costs paid to consulting firms which
monitor and evaluate pension fund performance. A local information
disseminating organization of this kind could be useful and supportive to smaller
pension funds interested in strategic investing.
In summary, workers first need to be aware of the existing places to find
pension fund investment information, such as AFL-CIO seminars, the
newsletter, Labor and Investments, and the California Pension Investment Unit.
Second, suggested organizations like a nationwide system for coordinating
shareholder voting, operated by the AFL-CIO , and the New York State Building
Trades Investment Information Committee, should be developed. Third, local
information organizations which can identify profitable local investment
opportunities, need to be created.
Pension funds whcih have implemented strategic investing have used
formal and informal information channels. The building trades often use their
own informal information networks to find out about mortgage investments.
Active public pension funds have set up task forces which have pushed them
further along the learning curve for strategic investing. Education for trustees
and beneficiaries on "pension fund power" and available information on
investments weakens the barriers to strategic investing.
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INSTITUTIONS WHICH FACILITATE STRATEGIC INVESTING
In addition to information organizations, innovative investment vehicles
and financial management institutions are needed to support strategic
investing. The existing strategic investment examples use a variety of non-
traditional investment vehicles, such as mortgage pooling, rehabilitation loans,
mortgage-backed securities, small business investments and a separate
mortgage account in a union insurance company. All these investment vehicles
need to be expanded and reworked according to the needs of different pension
funds to increase the use of strategic investing. Four general types of vehicles
or organizations which especially need to be expanded or created to facilitate
strategic investing are: 1) insurance mechanisms, 2) pooling mechanisms, 3)
institutions to increase mortgage investing, 4) institutions to facilitate
economic develpment investments. The institutions are interrelated and often
their functions overlap.
INSURANCE MECHANISMS
Pension funds are risk-averse, hence, institutions designed for pension
fund investment need to minimize the risk invovled in that investment. Pension
funds are more likely to participate in strategic investing if they are
guaranteed a certain return on their investment. First, I'll briefly mention two
insurance programs which already exist and facilitate strategic investing.
Second, we'll look at two other insurance programs proposed in California, but
which have not yet been implemented. Again, both the existing and suggested
programs may serve as models for state and private financial institutions
interested in supporting strategic investment.
One existing private insurance program is offered by Morgan Guarantee
Investment Corporation (MGIC). This program, already discussed in Chapter 1,
insures mortgages for pension fund investment. MGIC has primarily insured
public pension fund mortgage pools, but private pension funds can also purchase
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mortgage insurance. Other financial institutions are starting to design
mortgage insurance for pension funds. Private insurance, even for a small
percent of a loan can minimize risk and encourage strategic investing.
There are already federally insured investment vehicles which pension
funds have not taken full advantage of. Pension funds could easily substitute the
one hundred percent (100%) government instured Ginnie Maes, Fannie Maes or
SBA loans for corporate bonds. A portfolio manager can balance low risk
investments, like GNMA's against high risk investments, such as venture capital
securities. Pension fund managers are often unaware of the variety of federally
insured securities. These government insured loans could be marketed toward
pension fund investment to provide managers the option of a guaranteed
investment return. It would be relatively easy for pension funds to participate
in either of the existing privately or publicly insured investments.
Proponents of strategic investing in California have developed two
insurance programs, which have not yet been approved by the state legislature.
Under the first program the California Housing Finance Agency (CHFA) insures
rental housing mortgage loans made by pension funds. 3 knder this program, a
pension fund makes an "equity kicker" mortgage loan with a below market
interest rate in exchange for a portion of the appreciation in the future. The
program stipulates that the developer maintains the building as rental housing
for at least fifteen years. CHFA insures the loan principal and current interest
rate.
"The purpose of CHFA's insurance program is to provide a
substantially reduced risk to the lender (pension fund) for the
types of loans provided. An intensified underwriting of each
development will take place as if CHFA were making the loan
with the purpose of determining that each development
demonstrate a reasonable probability of success and represents
a should investment." 31
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The second program would create an Industrial Investment Insurance
Authority to insure small business loan pools for sale to pension funds.3 2 The
Authority would certify a bank to pool small business loans for purchase of
plant facilities, land and equipment. They, the bank, would sell a mortgage-
backed security to a pensin fund. The Authority would insure up to seven and
one half percent (7 1 %) of the mortgage pool and the bank would obtain private
insurance to satisfy pension fund standards. Plant and equipment loans in the
pool must be for a company located in California, with five hundred employees
or less, with a maximum eight-year mortgage term for equipment and fifteen
years for plant facilities. With the public and private insurance, pension funds
can prudently purchase small business loans "to generate acceptable returns
with minimal risk while encouraging investment in priority sectors of the
California economy.n?3 3
Under both the rental housing insurance program and the Industrial
Insurance Investment Authority, the insurance is offered by the state, but
available to public and private pension funds interested in participating. Both
insurance programs have a good chance of passing the legislature by 1983 and if
successfully implemented in California, other states should be encouraged to
design similar programs.
POOLING MECHANISMS
Pooling of pension funds also serves to minimize risk. Strategic investing
is more readily pursued when pension pooling takes place. 34 The Southern
California Foundation is a good example of facilitating stratgi: investment
through pooling. Recently, a mortgage pool financed by public and private
pension funds was set up in the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis. 35The
mortgage pool, called the Family Housing Fund (FHF) offer m6rtgage loans to
moderate income familes. FHF is financed by local public pension funds, union
pension funds, a foundation, a UDAG grant and a tax-exempt mortgage revenue
bond. The UDAG, foundation and bond monies help to insure the pension fund
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investment. This is one of the few programs in which public and private pension
fund monies are pooled for a strategic investment purpose and that aspect of
the program could be a model for other pension funds.
Many strategic investment objectives could be acheived by consolidating
the management of different pension plans. Theoretically, the AFL-CIO could
offer a large consolidated pension fund management service. The model for
this consolidated pension plan is the Teacher Insurance Fund (TIAA-CREF), one
of the larget pension funds in the nation.3 6 About six hundred fifty thousand
(650,000) teachers participation TIAA/CREF. The teachers are employees of
3,400 two and four year colleges who contribute to this pension fund. Although,
AFL-CIO has mentioned pooling many union funds under on management, such
as TIAA/CREF, the unions believe it is unrealistic and not a useful strategic
investment mechanism. The AFL-CIO Stucy on pension funds states:
"The survey of union officials confirmed that the present
system of diffuse but autonomous and independent pension
funds managed by hundreds and even thousands of individual
boards of trustees is not generally regarded as a problem, but
as a good thing, well worth preserving. Whereas, individual
board of trustees might be willing to turn over a part of their
fund's assets to a separate fund, such as an employment-
oriented reindustrialization or social fund, they would not go
along with relinquishing all control over the management or
investment of pension contributions made in behalf of their
mebers.? 3 7
Realistic pooling institutions need not consolidate entire pension funds, but
instead, pool small portions of different funds' assets. Financial institutions,
investment brokers, mortgage bankers and state agencies can all facilitate the
pooling of pension funds.
INSTITUTIONS TO INCREASE MORTGAGE INVESTING BY PENSION FUNDS
This paper has already discussed many of the institutions which can
facilitate pension fund investment in mortgages. The pooling and insurance
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mechanisms mentioned above are often designed to increase mortgage
investing. The following mortgage institutions also need to be developed,
expanded and marketed to support strategic investing:
Institutions to Package Mortgage-Backed Securities
More conventional mortgage-bakced security programs need to be
developed to encourage pension fund investment in mortgages. MGIC has
pooled conventional mortgages and offered insured pass-through securities to
state and local penison funds. MGIC's program is specially designed for pension
fund investment and might serve as a model for other financial institutions
capable of offering conventional mortgage-backed pass-through securities.
Private pension funds can work directly with a bank in designing a
conventional mortgage-backed security program. For example, a group of union
funds can issue forward commitments to purchase mortgages, according to
specifications, if a bank pools and insures the mortgages and then offers a pass-
through security to the funds.
A state institution could be very useful in coordinating a conventional
mortgage security program. California has two pending bills in the state
legislature to create an institution called "Callie Mae" to aggregate mortgage
loans from banks and assemble them into pools for concurrent resale to pension
funds38 The mortgage pools would either be insured through a private company
or the California Housing Finance Agency. "Callie Mae" is designed to
facilitate public and private pension fund investment in housing and to develop
a secondary mortgage market for home loans. If it accomplishes these goals, it
may also be a model other states can use to encourage targetted mortgage
investment.
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Mortgage Banking Firms
Pension funds need to develop and expand relationships with mortgage
banking firms that already know local mortgage markets. Mortgage banking
firms, in turn, should market their services for pension fund needs. Mortgage
bankers can identify areas in which there are financing gaps in the mortgage
markets. A mortgage banker can recommend local profitable investments
which have been underinvested in because of market failure. Pension funds
could benefit from mortgage bankers' expertise in the unique qualities of a local
mortgage market, on the risk involved in certain loans and their knowledge
about the cyclical and spatial variation on housing financial markets39
Expanding mortgage banking firms to include special pension investment
divisions would facilitate more mortgage investing by pension funds.
Expansion of Existing Labor-Related Mortgage Acccounts 40
Th two main labor-related institutions involved in mortgage investments
are ULLICO through its J for Jobs Account and the AFL-CIO through its
Mortgage Investment Trust (MIT). '-Labor unions have not taken advantage of
these institutions, often, because of a lack of knwledge among union trustees
concerning the services these institutions offer4 2 First, these institutions need
to market their servics to union pension funds. Second, they should attempt to
invest in mortgages from the areas in which the beneficiaries of the pension
funds live and work. Local building trades union want to create jobs for their
members and may be reluctant to invest in a national mortgage pool unless they
have an opportunity to increase jobs in their areas. These labor institutions are
important in supporting strategic investing, but need to be better marketed and
designed for different pension funds.
State mortgage agencies, banks, insurance companies, labor-related
financial institutions and mortgage bankers could all play a facilitating role in
encouraging pension funds to invest in new mortgages, such as graduated
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payment mortgages, shared appreciation mortgages, cooperative mortgages and
"equity kicker" mortgages. Often, pension funds are well suited for investment
in these new mortgage instruments because of their small liquidity needs and
long-term liabilities.
Pension funds have already started to invest small amounts of their assets
in mortgages. The mortgage institutions have been developed and just need to
be expanded to accommodate pension funds. The expansion of these mortgage
institutions is feasible and realistic. Advancing cooperation between pension
funds and existing mortgage institutions will increase the investment options for
pension fund trustees.
Institutions to Facilitate Economic Development Investments
In contrast to mortgage institutions, there are few institutions which
already exist to facilitate pension fund economic develpment investments.
Infact, institutions to support economi development investment are still in the
proposal stages. Most of the institutions mentioned here are future options for
pension funds rather than present ones.
A variety of mechanisms need to be developed to offer pension funds the
opportunity to invest in small and medium-size businesses. One proposal is that
public pension funds set aside a small percent of their assets, such a one
percent (1%) for venture capital partnerships. Some states would have to enact
legislation to permit their pension funds to invest in venture capital firms. The
goal of the set-aside fund would be to establish a supply of venture capital in a
state and create an opportunity for higher yields to the pension fund.4 3 A few
pension funds have already invested a small proportion of their assets in
establishing venture capital firms. Set-aside venture capital funds are realistic
current options for large pension funds, expecially those with in-house
managment.
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A group of pension funds could set up a pooled venture capital account, in
which each pension system would commit a small percentage of their assets to
the account, managed by a financial intermediary. California's Task Force
suggested establishing the California Venture Capital Allocation Fund, which
would function like a pooled venture capital account. The California Fund
would invest in California-based ventue capital partnerships. "Allocating a very
small portion of pension assets to this fund and the pooling of risk will make
such an arrangement prudent for pension funds, while offering opportunities for
higher yields and providing a constant supply of venture capital for the state's
economy." 44
In the last five years, a few states have started ventue capital
intermediaries, such as the Connecticut Product Development Corporation,
Massachusetts Technology Development Coporation and the Alaska Renewable
Resources Corporation. These intermediaries invest in young, technologically-
oriented companies which are "economically viable" but not capable of
obtaining sufficient capital on reasonable terms.4 5 Pension funds have never
invested in these public venture capital firms and it is unlikely, they will do so
in the near future. There is still too much risk attached to these public venture
capital investments. However, for pension funds interested in small business
investments, these intermediaries may be better able to manage the small firm
investment process than in-house management. These public intermediaries can
reduce risk involved in venture capital investments, through transferring it to
the government or pooling it away. 46 17here is at least a potential to match a
small percent of a pension fund's assets with these public venture capital
intermediaries to provide needed financing to small and medium-size businesses
and an opportunity for a higher return to the pension fund.
Larry Litvak, author of Pension Funds & Economic Renewal has proposed
an institution called a public investment broker to assist in matching small and
medium-size loans for private and public pension funds. New York City has
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established a similar institution called the Economic Capital Corporation to
"ereate financing packages on a joint and cooperative basis with private and
public capital sources', but it is not necessarily designed for pension fund
investment. The public investment broker would serve as a major source of
information to pension funds on small and medium-size business opprotunities.
Litvak writes:
"Besides influencing the menu of local investment
opportunities that receive consideration by pension funds, the
combined efforts of development authorities and public
investment brokers can eliminate the possibility that pension
funds will have to bear excessive administrative costs as a
result of the development dimension of these investments.
Any costs involved in searching out and evaluating such
investment opportunities greater, than those experienced in a
similar but not-targetted investment strategy would be in
effect, underwritten by these public sector institutions. These
inst it ut igs could in turn charge fees to the venture they
assist."
A public investment broker has minimal start-up costs and potentially can
provde a needed link betwen profitable businesses and pension fund capital.
A final approach to facilitating -economic development is to create state-
owned banks to manage pension fund assets. The only state owned bank in the
country, Bank of North Dakota, acts as the fiduciary agent and manages the
state pension fund's portfolio. Bank of North Dakota has a reputation for sound
financial management and has pursued a socially conscious investment policy.4 9
For example, the Bank gives priority to loans for small farmers and people
needing housing loans. 5 qn the last few years, proposals for state owned banks
have been introduced in Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and California
and if passed, they could be a serious threat to private commercial banks who
use pension funds. Both private and public pension funds could put their money
in state owned banks, if the bank is staffed with trust departments competent
to invest pension fund accounts. 5 tate-owned banks are not current options for
pension fund investment, especially in today's political and economic climate.
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But, state-owned banks certainly have the potential for being responsive to
strategic investment goals. Bank of North Dakota may serve as a future model
in creating state banks capable of managing pension funds.
In addition to creating responsive financial institutions, pension funds
should have their assets managed by institutions supportive of strategic
investing. Anumber of invstment banking firms have set up special "social
issues" and labor advisory committees. These committees are set up to help
pension funds avoid purchasing stocks from companies operating antithetical to
the pension fund's social and economic goals. Financial institutions with
committees and special "social action" funds play only a limited role in a
pension fund's strategic investment policy, but, nevertheless, are worthly of
support, since there are so many traditional financial institutions that refuse to
look at the social and economic impacts of their investments.
As we now can see, numerous institutions are required to support
strategic investing. These is a need for institutions to disseminate information
and educate, as well as institutions which expand investment options for pension
funds. Finally, there is a need for research on the experiments with strategic
investing.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Eduction of the public as to who owns pension fund assets, how and where
those assets are invested and their financial and social performance, is essential
for widespread implementation of strategic investing. In addition to education,
there is a need for more research on current pension fund investment practices
and evaluations of experiments with strategic investing. For example, we need
to know more about why pension funds have had such poor financial
performances. Is it because managers only look to the short term, or have they
been negligent with pension fund money? More rigorous research detailing bank
trust department decision making on pension fund investment is needed. It
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would also be helpful to know more about the interlocking directorships
between companies with pension funds and the institutions investing those
funds.
Secondly, research is needed to evaluate present attempts at strategic
investing. Methods of measuring displacement are especially needed. Thus far,
pension funds have no tool to estimate the degree of displacement of other
investors created by the entry of pension funds investing in mortgages or small
businesses, for example. In evaluating a strategic investment, researchers
could conduct economic studies to try to account for capital displacement
effects.5 2 Regional or state input-output models could be used to measure net
change in income and employment resulting from a given pension fund
investment5 3 The growth in income or employment to the region could be
compared to the administrative costs of implementing the non-traditional
investment.
A researcher could also evaluate the decision making process of pension
funds involved in strategic investing. Are the decision making processes any
more democratic than traditionally invested funds? Finally, research is needed
to better understand the obstacles to strategic investing. This paper identifies
two salient features common to the existing examples of strategically invested
pension funds: employee representation on a trustee board and the use of
innovative investment mechanisms. There may be other common features to
strategic investing, which if researched and identified, could help in overcoming
the obstacles.
SUMMARY
Joint trusteeship and non-traditional investment vehicles, were identified
as two important elements which support strategic investing. Once identified,
this chapter explored the intermediate steps toward gaining joint trusteeship of
a pension fund and the alternative investment vehicles needed to facilitate
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strategic investing. Information dissemination on pension funds is especially
needed, along with institutions permitting pension funds to invest in mortgages
and growing businesses. Numerous institutions should be created or expanded to
support strategic investing, such as insurance and pooling mechanisms use of
mortgage bankers, morgage-backed securities, labor-related mortgage
accounts, venture capital funds, public investment brokers and state-owned
banks.
Some of the institutions mentioned are currently available for penison
fund investment, while other institutions have yet to be developed. A pension
fund interested in strategic investing should begin with currently feasible
institutions. For example, first, a pension fund could put some of their assets in
"social accounts" of financial institutions. Seond, the fund could substitute
federally insured mortgages for corporate bonds. 4As the trustees became more
familiar with mortgages investments, they could invest in more mortgage-backe
securities, develop relationships the mortgage bankers, and take advantage of
labor-related mortgage institutions. Investments in economic development are
for pension funds which are more advanced at strategic investing, because there
are currently less exisiting insitutions to facilitate these investments. State
venture capital funds, public investment brokers and managment by state-
owned banks, may be future options for pention fund investments.
Finally, more research is needed to better undertand how the billions of
dollars in pension funds are currently invested and evaluate the consequences of
strategic investing by pension funds.
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CONCLUSION
Eight hundred billion dollars of social capital in the form of American
workers' pension funds are controlled by a financial elite who make major
ecnomic planning decisions for this country. Pension fund money is circulated
among the largest United States corporations. The Fortune 500 (pension funds)
finance the Fortune 500, with a handful of bankers acting as middlmen. And
the capital they are using is workers "deferred wages".
There are serious problems with this pension system which concentrates
financial power in the hands of a banking elite. The first problem is that there
are conflicts of interest between banks and the large companies in which they
invest. Second, under the present investment system, the largest companies are
in the best position to receive financing, while medium-sized businesses are
overlooked. As one pension fund observer stated: "As long as financial control
of capital remains so tightly concentrated, competition for funds will be heavily
weighted in favor of the needs and priorities of the large corporations." 'Third,
and most significantly, pension fund money is often not invested in the
financial, social or economic interests of workers who own the money.
There is potential, though, to invest pension funds in securities which have
added social benefits for fund members as well as secure financial returns.
Chapter Two suggests three potential forms of strategic investing. First,
pension funds can make investments which have direct benefits for members,
such as home mortgages. Second, pension funds can invest in the sectors of our
economy which tend to be underfinanced, but profitable. Instead of investing
all of the assets in "big business", pension fund trustees could set aside a small
percent of assets to invest in new companies which generate jobs and stimulate
economic growth. Third, there is the potential for workers to remove their
pension fund money from companies or banks which operate against the
interests of labor.
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Of course, there are tremendous obstacles to the implementation of these
strategic investment possiblities. The largest barrier to strategic investing is
employer-controlled pension funds. Employers have no incentive to consider
the consequences of pension fund invstments on workers. Traditional financial
institutions which invest pension funds are also a barrier to strategic investing.
These institutions are accustomed to investing in Fortune 500 stocks and bonds
and are uninterested in strategic investment goals Unfortunately, trustees
must turn over pension fund assets to traditional money managers, as there are
too few alternative investment institutions.
Pension funds which have implemented strategic investment policies have
had employee participation in investment decision making and sought out non-
traditional investment vehicles, overcoming both of the barriers mentioned.
From the examples, in Chapters Two and Three, we find that joint trusteeship
and access to alternative investment opportunities are key elements which
support strategic investing.
Identifying supportive elements to strategic investing is only a small step
toward the goal of changing traditional pension fund investment policies. The
battle to actually change traditional policies needs to be fought on a variety of
fronts.
First, workers in single-employer plans should negotiate for some form of
employee participation in pension fund management. For example, workers
could review investment managers, select actuaries, have control over a certain
percentage of the assets, or vote on the stock the pension fund holds. These
are intermediate steps toward a goal of joint control of the pension fund.
Second, unions and state governemtns must educate their constituents
about the prospect of using their pension funds to advance their own interests. 2
Information campaigns are needed of workers, trustees and the general public
on the possiblity of using pension funds to invest in housing and job creation in a
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region. State governments and unions could set up pension investment
clearinghouses to provide information on possible strategic investments, to
coordinate the voting of stock by different pension funds and to inform trustees
about companies which are blatantly anti-union. Turstees must have access to
investment information to begin changing traditional policies.
Third, unions and state pension fund trustees should invest more of their
assets in existing alternative investment vehicles and institutions. For
example, trustees could place some of their assets in those financial institutions
with "social accounts" and labor advisory committees. Next, trustees could
gradually invest more of their assets in mortgages by using federally insured
securities, conventional mortgage-backed securities and mortgage accounts in
labor-related institutions.
A fourth strategy is for unions and state pension funds to develop
alternative institutions to facilitate strategic invseting. Insurance and pooling
mechanisms designed for pension funds are needed. California's proposal for an
Industrial Insurance Investment Authority and mortgage insurance for rental
housing may serve as a model for the development of innovative insurance
mechanisms. The Family Housing Fund in Minnesota and the Foundation in
California are examples of creative pooling mechanisms for pension funds.
Investment vehicles are especially needed to facilitate pension fund investment
in economic development. State government should create public investment
brokers and state venture capital funds to offer the opportunity for higher
returns to pension funds and stimulate local economies. Both unions and state
should work toward the development of state-owned and union banks, which are
financially competent and responsive to pension fund investment goals. Barber
and Rifkin write: "By establishing viable alternatives for depositing pension
assets, unions would greatly increase their leverage with existing banks." 3
Finally, none of thees battles will be won easily. Employers will resist
giving up their monopoly control over pension funds. but, as the wealth of this
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country is more and more concentrated in a few corporations, it becomes even
more important that workers assert control over the assets they hold claims
over. As workers take more control in pension fund investment decisions, they
have the oppotunity to assure secure financial returns for retirees and control
the direction of capital investment in this country.
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